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ABSTRACT 
While social network analysis (SNA) has been utilized for a wide variety of purposes 
across various academic, business, and consulting fields, military applications of this 
emerging field have tended to focus on the “mapping” of dark networks. By borrowing 
from the considerable accumulation of SNA software and network theory, this work 
reveals how techniques designed for network analysis and dark network interdiction can 
also help reveal distinct characteristics of successful approaches to host nation interaction 
and indigenous network development. 
The network models examined in this thesis are drawn from William J. Lederer 
and Eugene Burdick’s book, The Ugly American. This text, widely viewed as an 
indictment of the application of U.S. foreign policy in Asia throughout the 
mid–20th century, serves as a foundation for the examination of indigenous network 
development at both the operational and tactical levels. The goal of this thesis is to 
illuminate and elucidate the unique characteristics of four network design approaches that 
appear in the book. This study also seeks to re-emphasize the important and often 
overlooked principles of effective host nation interaction presented in The Ugly American 
that have been recognized and discussed by generations of Foreign Service officers, 
military advisors, and civilian volunteers.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During these past years in Asia, the patterns of behavior I had observed in 
U.S. officials were about as broad as all humanity. There were some 
officials who affected a studied aloofness, saying that Americans couldn’t 
represent the United States properly if they became too involved with 
local people. There were others who strove for comradeship with the 
Asians around them:  some who went too far by going native and some 
who struck a good balance by remaining themselves while making friends. 
There were Americans of the “take charge” type, bossing everyone within 
site, often in order to get some worthwhile job done but stifling the 
initiative and stomping on the dignity of the very Asians they were trying 
to help. There were technicians blind to everything outside their 
immediate programs, at times gullibly and unwittingly aiding Asian 
political sharpies and money grubbers eager for the ‘pork barrel’ 
opportunities in some U.S. program. There were Americans who behaved 
nobly and those who behaved atrociously. There were bored Americans 
putting in career time and Americans who made every moment count.1  
Over a decade before retired Major General Edward Lansdale summarized the 
wide variation among the Americans he encountered while working overseas, William J. 
Lederer and Eugene Burdick published a best-selling work of historical fiction that 
presented an equally diverse assortment of characters embroiled in a struggle to stem 
Communist expansion into the fictional Southeast Asian nation of Sarkhan. Their book, 
The Ugly American, first appeared in 1958 and has since influenced generations of 
Americans who have devoted themselves to working with foreign populations. 
Host nation dignitaries and indigenous peoples throughout the world continue to 
encounter a mixture of American personalities as varied as those described by Lansdale 
and featured throughout The Ugly American. Each American serving abroad today has a 
conscious choice to make before they ever leave the United States:  they must choose 
what kind of American they will be when they set foot on foreign soil. 
What most Americans think of today when they hear the term “ugly American” is 
not Homer Atkins—the Ugly American presented in the book—or his successful 
                                                 
1 Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1991), 366. 
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endeavor to improve the lives of farmers in Sarkhan. In actuality, the kind of person who 
most people throughout the world think of when they hear the phrase “ugly American” is 
the antithesis of Homer Atkins. The expression has come to be associated with people 
who end up insulting the inhabitants of the distant lands they visit because they resist 
non-”American” ways of doing things and refuse to adapt to other countries’ social 
norms. These Americans contribute to a general sense prevalent in many regions of the 
world that Americans are an arrogant and xenophobic people who do not truly wish to 
help make the world a better place. Who would ever want to aspire to such an ideal?   
This work explores the choices made by several fictional characters in The Ugly 
American—all of which are based on real people and real events. It seeks to illustrate 
how their behavior impacted indigenous populations and supported or undermined the 
execution of U.S. foreign policy. The overall intent is to present options for those 
Americans who will travel abroad in the future and to challenge them with the most 
implausible goal:  be an “ugly” American.  
Two additional objectives of this thesis are 1) to illustrate the utility of social 
network analysis techniques for the exploration of the entire spectrum of host nation 
networks and 2) to examine various approaches to indigenous network development 
presented in The Ugly American. A final closely related theme involves attempting to 
rectify the decades-old misappropriation of the title of “ugly American.”  Many 
Americans have either forgotten or have never even been exposed to the myriad of 
lessons presented in the book (including the story of the Ugly American himself) that 
demonstrate how to respectfully and effectively interact with indigenous peoples. This 
thesis revisits what being “ugly” really means and in so doing reveals how the Ugly 
American and three other key characters in the book design successful host nation 
networks.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The tools of social network analysis (SNA) provide an insightful and potentially 
powerful framework for those interested in understanding how the increasingly complex 
networks of the 21st century operate. Professionals from various academic, business, and 
  3 
consulting fields currently utilize SNA for a wide variety of purposes. However, military 
applications of this emerging field of study focus primarily on the “mapping” of dark 
networks—covert enemy or criminal organizations that the military is attempting to 
disrupt, defeat, or destroy.2  Recently, the military has widened its use of SNA to include 
the mapping of friendly or light networks as part of a concerted effort to maximize the 
effectiveness of both indirect and direct approaches to interdicting threat networks 
worldwide.3  By borrowing from the considerable accumulation of SNA software, theory, 
and practices developed for network analysis and dark network interdiction, this work 
concentrates on the mapping of grey networks—those networks that are neither overtly 
tied to friendly light networks of the U.S. government or its foreign allies nor clearly 
under the control of adversarial dark networks.  
The Ugly American recounts a wide variety of attempts by Americans to 
understand and influence various non-aligned, threatened, or disadvantaged communities 
throughout Southeast Asia. Importantly, these communities do not necessarily support 
their host nation governments nor have they fallen completely under the sway of the 
Communist agents attempting to convert them to their cause. As evidenced by recent 
counterinsurgency initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as observations from other 
regions of the world, non-aligned or “neutral” populations actually have a tendency to 
                                                 
2 For further detail concerning dark networks, see Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks 
as Problems,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART 13, no. 4 (Oct. 2003): 413–
439. 
3 The U.S. military currently uses the terms direct and indirect to differentiate between the two key 
operational approaches to adversarial interdiction; see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 
Counterterrorism. Joint Publication (JP) 3–26 (November 2009), III-4 to III-7. For a discussion of similar 
concepts as they apply to SNA under the kinetic (direct) and non-kinetic (indirect) labels, see Nancy 
Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” Journal of Social Structure 12, 
no. 2 (2011): 1–32, http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12/Roberts Everton.pdf. 
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move frequently from one side to another in the midst of an ongoing internal conflict.4 
One Marine officer with counterinsurgency experience in Iraq asserts that current U.S. 
doctrine “fails to account for the fluid nature of a population where individuals may move 
back and forth [between sides] on a daily basis.”5 By addressing various approaches to 
interacting with indigenous populations in general, this study adds to the growing 
understanding of how best to influence various host nation networks—those that are 
adversarial (dark or red networks), those that are outwardly friendly to the U.S. (light or 
green networks), and those that are inclined to support both sides, be neutral, or switch 
their allegiances often (grey or white networks).6  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to utilize contemporary network theory and SNA 
techniques to examine “models” for indigenous network development extracted from The 
Ugly American. This study will use network concepts, graphs, and sociograms (i.e., 
visualizations) to illustrate the successful approaches to host nation network development 
presented in The Ugly American over 50 years ago. By using modern SNA techniques, it 
                                                 
4 The Sons of Iraq (SoI) initiative in Iraq and Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police 
(VSO/ALP) initiative in Afghanistan are two recent examples of U.S. efforts to work with indigenous 
populations whose loyalty to adversarial groups and to their host nation governments could be assessed as 
prone to vacillation based on the fluid conditions of each insurgency. Sparrow notes that dark (i.e., 
criminal) networks are dynamic and possess “fuzzy boundaries” resulting in it being difficult to pinpoint 
exactly who is a part of a particular dark network or for an analysis to remain accurate over time. These 
qualities are equally prevalent in destabilized communities where populations may often choose to 
passively or actively support an adversarial network based on simple cost-benefit analyses, changing 
perceptions of legitimacy, or as a result of violent coercion. Malcolm Sparrow, “Network Vulnerabilities 
and Strategic Law Enforcement,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 3 
(1991): 267–269. 
5 Lane V. Packwood. “Popular Support as the Objective in Counterinsurgency: What Are We Really 
After?” Military Review 89, no. 3 (2009): 69. Current U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine is detailed 
in: U.S. Department of the Army (DA) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), Counterinsurgency. Field Manual 
3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5 (December 2006). 
6 In addition to the network categorization used widely throughout the academic community (i.e., dark 
networks and light or bright networks), the U.S. military’s Attack the Network manual proposes the 
following network classifications:  red networks are “formal and/or informal grouping[s] of adversarial 
actors that are in opposition to the friendly networks;” neutral or white networks are “not hostile to, or in 
any way supportive of any one of the forces in a hostile environment;” blue networks consist of “military 
and government civilian U.S., allied and coalition forces;” green networks are “military and government 
civilian host-nation forces;” and black networks are “formal and/or informal grouping[s] of criminals that 
are not necessarily adversarial to the friendly networks, but thwart attempts to create stability so that they 
can further the aims of their criminal enterprises.” U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Commander’s 
Handbook for Attack the Network (May 2011), Glossary.  
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is possible to re-emphasize the important and still routinely overlooked principles of 
effective host nation interaction that have been recognized and discussed by generations 
of Foreign Service officers, military advisors, and civilian volunteers. When combined 
with proactive light network assistance and dark network interdiction, these approaches 
reflect a third aspect of comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy—grey network 
development. 
Published in 1958, The Ugly American is a roman à clef consisting of a collection 
of factually-based vignettes describing U.S. efforts to combat the spread of Communism 
in the fictional Southeast Asian country of Sarkhan. This text, widely viewed as an 
indictment of the misguided application of U.S. foreign policy in Asia throughout the 
mid-20th century, serves as a useful foundation for the examination of host nation 
network development at both the operational and tactical levels. It is not the intent of this 
study to imply that today’s scenarios are as cut-and-dry as those presented in the book or 
that any one of the four network models presented should be mirrored in its entirety. 
There are, however, a wide range of principles, ideas, and lessons that can be extracted 
from The Ugly American and incorporated into the working knowledge of any American 
interacting with indigenous populations. The goal of this study is to illuminate and 
elucidate distinct models of network design that can serve as either a starting point or as 
an additional resource for any individual or organization intent on understanding, 
modifying, or initiating indigenous network development.   
This introductory chapter provides the background and genesis of the research 
and its goals. Chapter II reviews the literature that informs the research with special 
attention to key concepts drawn from theories of social networks and network design.   
Chapter III describes social network analysis methodology and tools used to generate the 
network models mapped from The Ugly American. Chapter IV provides an overview of 
the “big picture” (i.e., macro-level) network extracted from the book. Ambassador Sears, 
the first American ambassador introduced in the book provides an example of what not to 
do and his replacement, Ambassador MacWhite, serves as his counter example when he 
engineers a successful counter-Communist campaign by enlisting the aid of Father 
Finian, Homer Atkins, and Colonel Hillandale. Chapter IV also briefly introduces three 
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additional characters who have a positive influence on U.S. efforts in Sarkhan but whose 
networks are not sufficiently described in the text to enable their mapping. 
Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII take a deeper dive into the four subnetworks that 
are extracted from the aggregated network. Each chapter’s title refers to the principle 
characteristic each network designer exemplifies. Ambassador MacWhite orchestrates a 
network of networks. Homer Atkins is a confederate who works side-by-side with the 
Sarkhanese people.7 Father Finian facilitates his network’s emergence and works by, 
with, and through a local proxy. And Colonel Hillandale uses persuasion to personally 
influence the members of his network.   
Each of these four network models presents a distinct approach to interacting with 
indigenous populations and developing host nation networks. The primary differences 
among the techniques revolve around the level to which each network designer interacts 
with the indigenous population and the level to which he is personally involved in 
directing his network’s activities. Colonel Hillandale does his work himself. Homer 
Atkins has a local proxy but chooses to work alongside him as a co-equal among the local 
population. Father Finian prefers to concentrate his efforts on finding and vetting a 
suitable local proxy who he then empowers to build a network and direct it along the 
general lines that Finian prefers. Ambassador MacWhite stays well away from directly 
interacting with the general population and instead makes contact with several American 
proxies who he then allows to develop their own approaches to supporting the 
Sarkhanese people. 
Chapter IX describes the macro-level implications of the thesis:  How can SNA 
be utilized to explore and influence grey or neutral host nation network development to 
                                                 
7 The title of confederate is utilized (instead of collaborator) to avoid the implication that he might be 
associated with adversarial entities.   
  7 
assist dark network interdiction in irregular warfare (IW) environments?8  Devoting an 
appropriate amount of effort and resources towards building networks similar to those 
derived from The Ugly American provides additional effects for commanders and policy 
makers attempting to stabilize host nation governments and indigenous populations under 
pressure from adversaries. These effects include: 1) “shrinking the white space” (i.e., 
denying needed resources and freedom of maneuver to adversarial groups); 2) helping to 
identify and counter adversarial entrepreneurial efforts to influence the population, 
exacerbate tensions, or exploit local grievances; and 3) serving as a conduit for a number 
of collateral activities that may indirectly or directly support a wide array of kinetic and 
non-kinetic IW operations and initiatives. 
  
                                                 
8 Irregular warfare is defined by current U.S. joint doctrine as “a violent struggle among state and non-
state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect 
and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order 
to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”  See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (March 
2012), 170. The five principal activities of IW are:  counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, foreign internal 
defense, unconventional warfare, and stability operations; see U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 
Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 (May 2010), 17.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Networks have recently risen to a prominent place in our view of human 
existence, in part due to the highly interconnected world made possible through social 
media. Professionals and academics from the fields of medicine, business, technology, 
and the social sciences have largely embraced the seemingly ubiquitous notion that 
networks can be used to explain a wide array of observations and to justify numerous 
theories and recommendations. Far from being confined to the academic circles from 
which it emerged, network theory is now prevalent in popular books, professional 
seminars, online interactions, and even viral phenomenon such as the “Six Degrees of 
Kevin Bacon”—an illustration of the “small-world” concept popularized by social 
psychologist Stanley Milgram’s research in the 1960s. 
The business world realized early on that the emerging field of network theory 
possessed profound implications pertaining to how companies might better organize to 
maintain relevance and a competitive advantage in the fast-paced, technology driven 
world that emerged in the latter part of the 20th century. Over the past decade, networks 
have become even more central as the proliferation of cell phones and increased access to 
the Internet have facilitated the formation of online social networks that have impacted 
everything from revolutionary causes and disaster relief efforts to how we decide what to 
buy or where to eat. Enduring insurgencies and global terrorist organizations have also 
led military and government agencies to embrace the study of networks in an effort to 
better understand and be able to defeat asymmetric adversarial organizations whose 
decentralized structure challenges traditional methods of interdiction. 
What is a network?  Simply put, a network consists of a set of two or more 
“nodes” or “actors” that are in some way connected to one another. As one noted network 
scholar observes, “networks are present everywhere”—from the interactions among 
individual cells in our bodies and neurons in our brains to the myriad of electronic signals 
that bind the Internet together and the connections that we establish and utilize in our 
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social circles.9  Today, the term “network” has developed several connotations and its 
meaning can have considerable differences among researchers from various academic 
disciplines. One of the many distinct divergences in how networks are defined and how 
network concepts are used is discussed below. For the theoretical framework of this 
work, the idea that network forms are ubiquitous and that they are present in the 
innumerable connections that surround us in our everyday lives, best describes its usage.    
Barabási traces the advent of modern network theory back to the origins of graph 
theory in the early 18th century.10 In 1736, a young Leonhard Euler, who would later 
become one of the most prolific and influential mathematicians in history, focused his 
genius on tackling an age-old conundrum that had amused the residents of a small village 
near his home in St. Petersburg. The question that he confronted was whether or not 
someone could walk across the seven bridges that spanned the town’s two rivers and 
connected its four separated land masses without ever crossing the same bridge twice (see 
Figure 1). The revolutionary method that Euler applied in his proof that no such route 
existed involved representing each of the four separate areas as a circle, or node, and each 
bridge as a line, or link. Together, these nodes and links created a graph or “a set of 
vertices and a set of lines between pairs of vertices.”11 And thus was born the now 
common practice of drawing lines between graphic representations of any number of 
people, places, or things that are somehow connected to one another. 
                                                 
9 Albert-László Barabási, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means 
for Business, Science, and Everyday Life (New York: Plume, 2009), 7. 
10 Ibid., 9–13. 
11 Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with 
Pajek (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 7. 
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Figure 1.  Visualization of Euler’s Königsberg Bridge Proof12 
Social networks are groups of nodes (e.g., people) whose connections allow 
something to be shared among the members of that particular network.13 Sharing a link 
with a long-dead ancestor, for instance, may include that relative in your extended family 
network but that person could not be considered part of your active social network. 
Christakis and Fowler further elaborate by labeling this necessary transmission across 
social network ties as “contagion.”  They submit that the transfer of everything from 
“germs, money, violence, kidneys, happiness, or obesity” can illustrate the existence of a 
social network.   
Social network analysis (SNA) consists of “a collection of theories and methods 
that assumes that the behavior of actors (whether individuals, groups or organizations) is 
profoundly affected by their ties to others and the networks in which they are 
embedded.”14  SNA seeks to capture and scrutinize the social ties among people, 
organizations, or nations that are involved in social relations.15 For this work, SNA’s 
detection and visualization process—with its roots dating back to Euler’s bridge 
                                                 
12 From Barabási, Linked, 11. 
13 Nicholas Christakis and James H. Fowler, Connected: How Your Friends’ Friends’ Friends Affect 
Everything You Feel, Think, and Do (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 16. 
14 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 2. 
15 de Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj, Exploratory Network Analysis, 5. 
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problem—is sufficient to form the basis for the network models proposed in the ensuing 
chapters. An interpretation of the technical metrics that are at the core of SNA’s 
relevance and utility (e.g., network topography, centrality measures, or subgroup 
cohesion) may indeed provide additional insight into the network development detailed in 
The Ugly American, but such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this particular study.    
A. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN NETWORK THINKING (ABRIDGED)  
In a pivotal article written in 1990, organizational sociologist Walter Powell 
confronted the contemporary notions of organizational structure after observing that 
“firms appear to be changing in significant ways and forms of relational contracting 
appear to have assumed much greater importance.”16 His examination of the importance 
of relationships and how they affect lines of communication, horizontal as opposed to 
vertical integration, and the flow of resources revealed the need to address the network 
organizational structure as an entity unto itself. Powell argued that networked 
organizations displayed distinct qualities that could not be adequately captured by 
attempting to categorize this emerging form of systemic governance along the traditional 
market-hierarchy continuum. In his effort to define networks “as a distinctive form of 
coordinating economic activity,”17 Powell expanded upon the then-current economic 
theory that viewed markets as “spontaneous coordination mechanisms” occupying the 
decentralized extreme of economic organization and hierarchies as rigid administrative 
entities that marked the other end of the spectrum.   
Throughout the evolution of network study, two general approaches to defining 
networks have emerged. The first views networks primarily as one type of organizational 
form while the second sees characteristic components of networks existing everywhere—
both in the natural world and in nearly every realm of human existence. The prevailing 
sentiment that came to dominate economic and business theory, as well as the field of 
international relations, followed Powell’s line of thought contending that networks are a 
                                                 
16 Walter Powell, “Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,” Research in 
Organizational Behavior 12 (1990): 297. 
17 Ibid., 301. 
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discrete form of organization, one of several options possessing unique characteristics.18  
Hierarchical organizational structures, for example, are typically focused on the 
production of specific goods or services and tend to be more formalized and rigid. In 
contrast, network organizations are generally more decentralized and open to new ideas 
and innovative processes. Organizational management theorists began identifying the 
characteristics of the networked organization several decades ago,19 eventually 
describing the configuration as an “adhocracy” and giving this unique organizational 
form its rightful place alongside more recognizable and formalized forms of 
bureaucracies and traditional hierarchical structures.20 Since then, numerous scholars 
have devoted considerable effort towards further revealing the distinct qualities, 
strengths, and weaknesses of adhocracies and networked organizations as they exist in 
the modern world. 
A second school of thought embraced by many in the social network analysis 
field is that all interactions between two or more entities, no matter how broadly or how 
narrowly defined, constitute a network. Therefore, even a rigid, traditional hierarchical 
structure that lacks the characteristics of a “network organization” is considered a 
network. In a sense, everything is a network and the examination of ties and relationships 
between the nodes in a particular network can provide a tremendous amount of insight 
into how well or how poorly each particular system is functioning (regardless of its 
intended purpose). Krackhardt and Hanson differentiate between the formal relationships 
inherent in an organization’s hierarchical structure and the informal networks (i.e., trust, 
 
                                                 
 18 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why Al-
Qaida may be Less Dangerous than Many Think,” International Security 33, no. 2 (Oct. 2008): 11. 
19 For an early description of emerging organizational leadership and structure characterized as both 
“temporary” and “adaptive,” see Warren G. Bennis and Philip Elliot Slater, The Temporary Society (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1968). While the authors do not apply the designation “adhocracy,” they describe the 
future of organizational leadership as necessitating “an active method for producing conditions where 
people and ideas and resources can be cultivated to optimum effectiveness and growth.”  For insight into 
the early popularization of the term “adhocracy,” see Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random 
House, 1970). 
20 Henry Mintzberg describes the following six major organizational configurations:  Machine 
Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, Simple Structure, Divisionalized Form, Adhocracy, and 
Missionary Configuration in Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1993). 
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advice, communication) that exist behind the scenes. They demonstrate that informal ties 
have a substantial impact on what actually transpires in an organization’s day-to-day 
operations.21   
The second approach to networks has revealed significant implications that cross 
over all of the organizational configurations described above and into nearly every aspect 
of human existence. From the subtle yet profound ways that “weak ties” in our social 
circles impact our lives to how intangible “social” capital affects job performance and 
organizational effectiveness, the expanding insight into the unique characteristics of 
network relationships continues to offer new ways to examine the world around us. It 
also is helping to improve the way we design and contribute to our own personal and 
professional networks—even those we encounter while working in foreign countries.22 
B. NETWORK THEORY AND RELATED CONCEPTS 
Gaining an appreciation of the current state of network theory is an important step 
for those interested in pursuing network design or incorporating network principles into 
their skill-sets. In addition to including his discoveries concerning network scale and 
other characteristics of complex networks, Barabási provides a comprehensive and 
accessible overview of contemporary network thinking in Linked: How Everything Is 
Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday 
Life. The text includes a history of the evolution of network theory over the past two 
centuries and addresses a wide range of subjects from modern implications concerning 
the vulnerability of Internet hubs to basic network principles such as the “small worlds” 
and “six degrees of separation” concepts. Barabási successfully demonstrates that 
                                                 
21 David Krackhardt and Jeffrey R. Hanson, “Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart,” 
Harvard Business Review 74, no. 4 (July 1993): 104–111. 
22 For Granovetter’s original study concerning “weak ties,” see Mark Granovetter,”The Strength of 
Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 73, no. 6 (1973):1360–1380. For additional detail concerning 
“social capital” and  how it relates to more traditional forms of financial and intellectual capital, see 
Patricia Anklam, Net Work: A Practical Guide to Creating and Sustaining Networks at Work and in the 
World (Boston: Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007), 13–16, 151–152, 229–230. 
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networks and network-based phenomenon exist all around us and are extremely 
important to nearly all aspects of human existence.23 
In Connected, Christakis and Fowler also provide a compelling argument that 
networks deserve considerable attention and are impacting the modern world in 
astoundingly frequent and interesting ways.24  Their work focuses on the interdependent 
relationship between individuals and the groups that form around them (i.e., the networks 
that we help shape and that simultaneously shape who we are). Their corollary to the “six 
degrees of separation” rule, what they call the “three degrees of influence rule,” holds 
that our own actions will tend to affect friends and colleagues in our social network out to 
three degrees (friends of our friends’ friends). While much of Christakis and Fowler’s 
research centers on modern technology and the abundant network phenomenon present in 
today’s “hyperconnected” world, their insights into the spread of influence describe an 
important discovery concerning network behavior and provide a useful addendum to 
more traditional approaches that can be applied to the examination of network leadership. 
Each of the network models presented in this study contains a central figure that is 
responsible for initiating their network’s emergence or evolving it to meet their desired 
purpose. The role of these actors and the influence they exert over their networks are 
central to the study’s analysis. Whether viewed as “catalysts,” “translational leaders,” 
“choreographers,” or “influentials,” numerous authors have observed that individual 
leaders play critical roles in how networks establish themselves and progress over time. 
Some networks simply need a charismatic person to coalesce around while others might 
flourish (or just barely manage to survive) because they learn to successfully collaborate 
or establish open dialogue.25 
                                                 
23 Barabási, Linked. 
24 Christakis and Fowler, Connected. 
25 This study relies heavily on the principles of collaboration detailed in:  David Straus, How to Make 
Collaboration Work: Powerful Ways to Build Consensus, Solve Problems, and Make Decisions (San 
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2002). For a process oriented guide to improving organizational and 
interpersonal communication, see Deborah L. Flick, From Debate to Dialogue: Using the Understanding 
Process to Transform our Conversations (Boulder, CO: Orchid Publications, 1998). 
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Several scholars contend that certain people are simply born to play critical roles 
in influencing the lives of those around them. Gladwell’s “law of the few” suggests that 
some of these special people possess specific traits that allow them to easily connect with 
other people; that some are charismatic and persuasive “salesmen;” and that some possess 
the capacity to gather and retain a tremendous amount of detailed information that allows 
them to be frequently called on to offer expert advice.26   
During their research on systemic resilience, Zolli and Healy found that leaders 
who were able to successfully guide their constituents through periods of evolution or 
dramatic disruptions did not possess any common physical attributes and were not simply 
able to connect with a large number of diverse people.27  These “translational” leaders 
were skilled at making connections between seemingly disparate groups; they were able 
to “translate” across various levels both within and outside of their organizations and lead 
from the “middle-out.”  What other characteristics might impact a person’s ability to lead 
other people, particularly when that person is interacting with people from a different 
culture?  
The extensive canon of literature from the fields of individual and organizational 
behavior and social psychology contains innumerable hypotheses that seek to explain 
how leaders actually go about the process of leading. There are undoubtedly a multitude 
of authors whose ruminations on leadership could serve to inform the examination of 
network leadership presented in this study. To further narrow the scope of the research 
for this project, critical facets of interpersonal influence, trust establishment, and group 
collaboration were isolated from several fields of study and utilized to inform the various 
in-depth analyses of the network designers presented in subsequent chapters.    
First published in 1984, Cialdini’s highly regarded book, Influence: The 
Psychology of Persuasion, details six of the most common and effective approaches used 
                                                 
26 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things can make a Big Difference (Boston: Back 
Bay Books, 2002), 30–88. 
27 Andrew Zolli and Ann Marie Healy, Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back (New York: Free Press, 
2012), 239–258.  
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to elicit compliance.28  Cialdini’s work addresses basic but pivotal concepts of measuring 
a persuader’s likeability or a target audience’s predisposition towards obedience and 
includes more complicated scenarios such as increasing the perceived scarcity of a good 
or service to make someone want it more. The text provides guidelines for individuals 
and organizations (including those operating among foreign populations) that are either 
attempting to influence others or are interested in being able to recognize external 
attempts at manipulation.    
Social psychologists John French and Bertram Raven provide a useful paradigm 
for examining interactions with indigenous networks. In a study first published in 1959, 
they describe the various factors that impact how individuals respond to external attempts 
to induce change. By advancing the understanding of the fundamental forces that underlie 
how well or how poorly external influence is received (what French and Raven refer to as 
the “bases of social power”), influence operations and host nation network development 
may be more effectively and efficiently planned and executed.29  
The social power that external actors may wield over indigenous populations is 
significantly tied to perceptions of trust. Like the role of influence, understanding the role 
of trust in network development is critical for network developers who plan on 
establishing tight-knit or long-lasting relationships with their network members. An 
understanding of the nature of trust as described in trust literature can assist network 
designers in differentiating between the basic factors that influence category-based trust 
(e.g., perceptions of role responsibilities and expectations, being able to identify with 
someone based on shared group membership) and those that affect person-based trust 
(e.g., perceived levels of benevolence, integrity, and competence).30 For most network 
designers, a basic appreciation for how individual (i.e., person-based) and collective (i.e., 
category-based) actions effect the transference of trust is sufficient to enable them to 
                                                 
28 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: Quill, 1993). 
29 French and Raven’s five bases of social power consist of:  reward power, coercive power, referent 
power, legitimate power, and expert power. John French and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” 
in Studies in Social Power, ed. John French et al. (Oxford: University of Michigan Press, 1959), 150–167. 
30 Barbara D. Adams and Robert D.G. Webb, “Trust in Small Military Teams,” accessed October 3, 
2012, http://www.dodccrp.org/events/7th_ICCRTS /Tracks/pdf/006.PDF. 
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more effectively approach a specific task or a particular person. Network designers 
working with foreign populations may benefit further from Sztompka’s more detailed 
examinations of the “deployment” of trust and his differentiation between primary trust 
(i.e., trust based on reputation, performance, and appearance) and secondary trust (i.e., 
trust calculations tied to accountability, pre-commitment, trust-inducing situations).31    
C. NETWORK EXAMINATION 
This study relies on Dr. Nancy Roberts’ Continuum of Network Designs (see 
Figure 2) as a primary tool for network examination.32  This graphic representation of a 
network at a specific time offers a discrete, comprehensive snapshot of where that 
network fits on the broad continuum between anarchical disunion and rigid organization. 
This approach evaluates networks according to three separate criteria: 1) level of 
openness (open to closed); 2) level of formality (informal to formal); and 3) level of 
planning (self-organizing/emergent to planned). Traditional organizational structures 
(often referred to as hierarchies) occupy the far right extreme of the continuum and tend 
to be highly formalized, largely inflexible, and founded on strict authoritarian 
relationships focused on producing tangible results. In contrast, “ad hoc” networks are 
typically more informal in nature, retain a high degree of flexibility, and produce 
significant intangible value through mutual trust and accountability, shared interests, and 
common purpose.33 Networks that are completely open, informal, and solely self-
organizing—those that would occupy the far left of the continuum—risk falling into an 
anarchical state and finding it exceedingly difficult to maintain solvency or consistency 
of purpose. 
                                                 
31 Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 69–
97. 
32 Nancy Roberts, “Notes on Networks” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 9 April 
2012). 
33 Anklam, Net Work, 22–25. 
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Figure 2.  Dr. Nancy Roberts’ Continuum of Network Designs 
In addition to the continuum and individual network visualizations, the analysis of 
each of the four networks drawn from The Ugly American also includes a description of 
the network’s background and each network’s purpose, structure, style, and value. These 
four principal components of networks are drawn from Patti Anklam’s book, Net Work, 
and provide essential insight into the unique design processes inherent in each of the 
models presented. A network’s purpose is what brings the network to life and what 
makes its members “care” about it in the first place. Anklam’s first principle of networks 
posits that all networks can be drawn and that the resulting structure reflects how various 
responsibilities, roles, and social bonds are arranged within a particular network. The four 
basic network structures that appear in this study are shown in Figure 3. Style refers to a 
network’s “social climate,” how its members interact with one another, whether it is 
meant to produce specific results or is oriented on discovery, and how the network’s 
leaders approach their responsibilities. Finally, a network’s value indicates whether what 
the network produces is tangible or intangible and whether or not its value is what was 
initially sought after by the network or something different that has emerged throughout 
the network’s evolution.34 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 30. 
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Figure 3.  Network Structures: Hub-and-Spoke, Mesh, Federated, Core/Periphery35   
D. THE U.S. MILITARY AND NETWORK THEORY36 
The Commander’s Handbook for Attack the Network published in May 2011 
serves as one illustration of where the American military currently stands on 
incorporating network principles into “population-centric” irregular warfare operations. 
Although the Attack the Network (AtN) handbook is not approved joint doctrine, the 
document and its Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) authors are at the leading edge of 
efforts to “further develop the application of AtN techniques to the conduct of military 
operations and mature AtN concepts for possible transition into joint doctrine.”37  The 
title of the publication is somewhat misleading as the document is a comprehensive study 
that presents a wide variety of pertinent network concepts and attempts to address the 
entire spectrum of threat, friendly, and neutral networks. As the handbook puts forth in its 
initial chapter: 
AtN involves more than the focused use of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance] assets, analytical methodologies, and dynamic or 
deliberate targeting means. If AtN is to make a contribution to the success 
of the overall joint operation/campaign, it must be a part of a broader, 
command wide effort to: 1) Build a better friendly network, 2) Empower 
information exchange, 3) Employ all enablers, and 4) Exploit all 
opportunities with IO [information operations]. These fundamental actions 
leverage the lethal and nonlethal capabilities of the military force and 
                                                 
35 These network illustrations appear separately in Anklam’s Net Work. From Ibid., 58, 67, 75. 
36 The U.S. military’s Commander’s Handbook for Attack the Network currently defines a network as:  
“that group of elements forming a unified whole, also known as a system;” it further states that “networks 
are comprised of people, processes, places, and material—components that are identifiable, targetable, and 
exploitable.” USJFCOM, Attack the Network, GL-23, III-1. 
37 Ibid., iii. 
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participating United States Government (USG), multinational, and HN 
[host nation] partners.38 
The AtN handbook, like the military’s current counterinsurgency manual, does 
address critical concepts pertaining to networks and the use of SNA in irregular warfare 
environments. What appears to be beyond the scope of both manuals and where this 
study seeks to provide additional insight is in describing how military and interagency 
personnel might best go about the task of actually initiating or influencing “white” 
networks (i.e., the general population). To illustrate this point, the AtN handbook goes so 
far as to suggest that “enabling friendly networks” should be the “decisive effort” within 
the proposed AtN methodology (see Figure 4) yet almost the entire chapter on “engaging 
the network” is devoted to directly interdicting threat networks. 
 
Figure 4.  Example Attack the Network Lines of Effort39 
                                                 
38 Ibid., I-3. 
39 From Ibid., IV-4. 
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Additionally, the inclusion of only one Civil Affairs (CA) staff member on the 
proposed AtN Working Group (see Figure 5) suggests a potential oversight when 
attempting to recommend a functioning staff whose capacity to devise acceptable courses 
of action is proportionally aligned with the suggested “decisive effort.”  To further 
clarify, the proposed Working Group contains 34 members—only two of these positions 
(the CA/MISO seat and the Information Operations seat) are filled by specialists whose 
primary purpose is to impact popular support and influence indigenous communities. 
Civil Affairs personnel might be the most qualified members of the proposed staff who 
could ostensibly plan, monitor, or orchestrate a wide range of indigenous network 
development initiatives similar to those examined in this study. 
 
Figure 5.  Attack the Network Working Group40 
Other service and joint publications that are officially approved doctrine contain 
far less discussion on the significance of networks—although, as previously noted, the 
                                                 
40 Ibid., V-6. 
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counterinsurgency manual does address SNA. Several manuals do, however, allude to the 
importance of popular support and unequivocally present the role of the population as 
being critical to success in irregular warfare environments. Yet the majority of the 
applicable doctrine provides little descriptive content, assessment techniques, or 
operational suggestions concerning how to affect arguably the most critical task 
necessary for conflict resolution—influencing the majority of the population to reject the 
counter-state movement. While it is beyond the scope of this study to provide specific 
recommendations for future joint or service doctrine, by addressing where the military’s 
grasp of network theory is at the present time, this work does seek to add to the 
discussion concerning how best to move forward.   
This study is ultimately about the choices that Americans make while serving 
overseas and about learning from the fictional and real-life lessons of recent and not-so-
recent history. It seeks to pull from a variety of sources in an effort to provide effective, 
feasible options for those Americans who will interact with indigenous populations in the 
future. As the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, 
recently observed: 
To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate 
our actions and much more about what our actions communicate. I also 
hope we learn to be more humble, to listen more. Because what we are 
after in the end—or should be after—are actions that speak for themselves, 
that speak for us. What we need more than anything is credibility.41 
  
                                                 
41 Michael G. Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” Joint Forces Quarterly 55 
(2009): 4. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This study first began with the realization that The Ugly American described a 
multitude of interesting social interactions that had the capacity to be analyzed using 
SNA software. The majority of the book’s 23 chapters are self-contained accounts 
typically centered on a particular character’s successful or ill-fated attempts to influence 
various indigenous populations throughout Southeast Asia. This format allowed the 
individual networks that developed around each character to be isolated and separately 
analyzed.   
Several of these individual network developers were indirectly connected to one 
another through the work of Ambassador Gilbert MacWhite (discussed in detail in 
Chapters IV and V). MacWhite’s role is central both to this analysis and to the story 
presented in The Ugly American. His actions serve to unite the three other main 
characters in this study to the larger network that he forms as part of a comprehensive 
effort to stop Communist expansion into the fictional nation of Sarkhan.   
Only a small portion of the characters presented in The Ugly American actually 
became part of this analysis. Of the 300 Americans that he served with in Sarkhan, 
Ambassador MacWhite asserts that, “only five of them were at all valuable in our 
struggle against Communism.”42  As a result of this pivotal statement, the focus of this 
study was narrowed to the relationships developed by MacWhite and these five 
individuals. The activity of two of these change agents, John Colvin and Major Wolchek, 
is not described in sufficient detail in the text to warrant their inclusion as separate 
network developers (although each character is addressed in Chapter IV).43   There is, 
however, enough information in the text for the actions of MacWhite and the other three 
change agents (Homer Atkins, Father Finian, and Colonel Hillandale) to be coded into 
                                                 
42 William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: Norton, 1999), 267. 
43 For the purposes of this work, a change agent is defined as an individual actor who, in an official or 
unofficial capacity, seeks to modify, coerce, manipulate, or otherwise influence the belief system, way of 
life or livelihood, or personal preferences of another actor or group of actors. For clarification, Anklam 
defines a “change agent” as an individual who purposefully bridges boundaries between different groups 
and organizations to bring specific actors or functions into their network. Anklam, Net Work, 210–211. 
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SNA-software and analyzed based on established network techniques and principles of 
interpersonal interaction and group collaboration. 
To produce the network sociograms that are the essential SNA-based contribution 
to this study, the text was first carefully examined to identify and define the types of ties 
that best described the majority of the connections made between the four change agents 
and the other characters that they encountered in The Ugly American. The ties that were 
identified consist of informal connections based on trust, advice, or friendship and formal 
ties based on participation or membership in the same organization, operation, or 
business (each relationship is defined in detail below).44 
1. Trust Ties. Trust relations are defined by the willingness of an actor (i.e., 
character) to stake personal reputation, capital, life, or livelihood on another actor’s 
ability to do what they say they can or will do. When not directly and explicitly addressed 
in the text (e.g., “This man can be trusted.”), trust is inferred through an actor’s deliberate 
and voluntary choice to establish a relationship with another actor that relies on the 
implicit expectation that the other actor will do what he or she says that they will do.  
2. Advice Ties. Advisory relations consist of one actor’s reliance on another 
actor’s technical, tactical, personal, or professional input to inform or otherwise impact 
one’s decision calculus. In Sarkhan, as in many Asian countries, this may include advice 
generated through the practice of astrology, palm-reading, and similar “occult” sciences. 
3. Friendship Ties. Friendship relations are defined as attachments to another 
actor based on affection or esteem. 
4. Organizational Ties. Organizational relations are defined as two actors sharing 
simultaneous membership in a formal organization. Coded organizations include political 
parties, governmental institutions, and resistance movements. 
5. Operational Ties. Operational relationships consist of shared participation in 
the execution of a discrete act. Operations may be hastily or deliberately planned and can 
                                                 
44 For further detail concerning informal networks, see Krackhardt and Hanson, “Informal Networks,” 
104–111. 
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include distinct events in the execution of one’s official responsibilities (e.g., non-routine 
or event driven diplomatic negotiations). 
6. Business Ties. Business relationships are defined as participation as an owner, 
employee, or customer of a for-profit organization. 
Following the identification of these six ties, the relationships of 95 characters 
connected to the four change agents were encoded into the SNA software platform, 
UCINET. To provide additional fidelity, each character’s nationality and general role 
were also identified and added in UCINET (see Table 2 for additional detail on these 
attributes). Six of the 95 characters serve only to illustrate the original U.S. Embassy 
network that was established by MacWhite’s predecessor, Ambassador Sears (see 
Chapter IV). With the exception of Ambassador MacWhite’s extended network, the 
author attempted to include all of the relevant characters that were a part of or directly 
connected to each of the three other networks (i.e., Finian’s, Atkins’, and Hillandale’s). 
MacWhite encountered several additional characters throughout the book whose 
inclusion would only further illustrate the federated nature of his network and his 
propensity to develop numerous “weak” ties and accept input from a variety of external 
sources (see Chapter V). 
All six relational ties were coded to produce Ambassador MacWhite’s 89-member 
extended network as it appears in the study. This network was extracted from chapters 1–
5, 10, 15, 17, 18, and 21 in The Ugly American. Homer Atkins’ network consists of 42 
members that were involved in the formation of the Jeepo-Atkins Company (see Chapter 
VI). This network was derived principally from chapters 17, 18, and 21 in The Ugly 
American and includes relationships based on business connections, advice, and trust. 
Father Finian’s “Nine Friends” network consists of 14 characters whose organizational 
and trust ties are revealed in chapters 3, 4, and 21 of The Ugly American (see Chapter 
VII). Colonel Hillandale’s 13-member “Cuenco 10” network emerges in chapters 9, 10, 
15, and 21 of The Ugly American (see Chapter VIII). It includes the friendship, advice, 
and organizational ties that emerge between Colonel Hillandale and the ten Filipinos that 
he influences and between Colonel Hillandale, Ambassador MacWhite, and Magsaysay.   
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Table 1 provides an example of the UCINET dataset (with all ties joined and 
aggregated) that was produced by coding relationships from chapters 3, 4, and 21 of The 
Ugly American. Father Finian’s “facilitator” network consists of informal trust ties and 
formal organizational ties. Coded ties represent the presence of either a positive or 
negative connection based on each relationship and are non-valued (i.e., -1, 0, or 1).   
 
Table 1.   UCINET Dataset Display of Father Finian’s Network 
Each network was then processed through UCINET’s network visualization tool, 
NetDraw, to produce the sociograms used throughout this study (see Figure 6). Network 
visualizations that benefitted from illustrating negative ties (i.e., Ambassador Sear’s 
network shown in Figure 8) were produced by exporting the UCINET dataset into the 
Pajek SNA software platform. 
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Figure 6.  Example NetDraw Visualization (Father Finian) 
While not all of the networks coded and presented in this study existed 
simultaneously, each represents a network that the respective change agent personally 
established and could potentially reengage. Additionally, for the purposes of this work 
the network visualizations serve to illustrate the types of network development that 
Ambassador MacWhite (and the book’s authors) considered effective and how each 
change agent’s distinctive approach manifested in a unique network design methodology. 
Although other relationships might presumably have existed between the fictional 
characters in The Ugly American, this study has attempted to avoid any undue 
extrapolation of probable relationships and instead focuses on connections that should be 
readily apparent when filtered through the previously defined ties. It is likely, for 
instance, that certain members of the Cuenco 10 or Jeepo-Atkins network considered 
each other friends; however, the coding of potential relationships is not within the 
purview of this study and would likely only obscure the basic yet distinctive lessons that 
Lederer and Burdick presented in their novel.   
Relationships that would only have produced redundant ties between nodes were 
also purposefully not coded. For example, there is evidence that operational and advice 
ties existed between the Burmese members of Father Finian’s core network, yet coding 
Father Finian
Archbishop of Mokthu
U Tien (Friend" 1)
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these additional ties would only have reinforced the organizational ties already identified. 
Since a simple visualization of the relationships established between the actors in each 
network was sufficient for this study, the critical ties that bound together the network’s 
members are noted to further augment the understanding of each network’s genesis.   
As addressed previously, the four change agents that became the focus of this 
study were singled out for two reasons:  1) they were principal characters who the authors 
of The Ugly American used to illustrate what they believed to be effective methods of 
host nation interaction, and 2) there existed sufficient (albeit incomplete) information in 
the text to serve as a basis for the mapping of their respective networks. 
Incompleteness is a challenge faced often by network researchers. In addition to 
his observations concerning “fuzzy boundaries” and the dynamic nature of dark 
networks, Sparrow comments on the inevitable incompleteness of network data where 
“some existent links will be unobserved or unrecorded.”45  Although Sparrow’s work 
focused on dark networks, this phenomenon is prevalent throughout network analysis 
where network “mapping” relies on getting enough (hopefully accurate) information for 
the process to be undertaken in the first place.   In his critique of the “influentials 
hypothesis,” Duncan Watts recounts several shortcomings related to the procurement of 
anecdotal evidence—the kind of evidence needed to inform social network analysis (e.g., 
through interviews, questionnaires, or even interrogations). Watts cites several memory 
biases (e.g., recency and hindsight bias) and the “filling in” of unremembered details as 
key contributors to what one study revealed as a 50 percent inaccuracy rate among 
respondent-driven data. In an observation particularly relevant to SNA, Watts suggests 
that “when asked to whom they go for advice, respondents may simply name individuals 
whose roles position them as advice-givers . . . rather than first recollecting the last time 
they actually sought advice.”46  
In this regard, the data collected from The Ugly American (and other fictional 
accounts, for that matter) might be considered even more “accurate” than traditional data 
                                                 
45 Sparrow, “Network Vulnerabilities,” 268. 
46 Duncan Watts, “Challenging the Influentials Hypothesis,” Measuring Word of Mouth 3 (2007): 
203–204. 
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pulled from real-world sources. While the narrative provided in the novel remains 
incomplete and the authors unfortunately are no longer available to confirm or deny the 
assertions made in this study, fictional accounts like The Ugly American have the 
capacity to reveal what a character actually believes and feels rather than simply 
providing an account of an individual’s actions or a person’s fallible recollections. This 
does not mean to suggest that there are necessarily any correlations between the activities 
and thought-processes of the characters contained in this study and those of any human 
being who has ever actually attempted to develop indigenous networks. It does beg the 
question, though:  Should there be in the future? 
Finally, it should be noted again that The Ugly American is a factually-based work 
of fiction that contains several characters based on individuals who actually worked in 
Asia in the mid-20th century. Biographical accounts of men ranging from T. E. Lawrence 
to Edward Lansdale (the basis for the character of Colonel Hillandale) and books and 
studies produced by civilian volunteers and U.S. advisors serving in conflict zones 
throughout the world also serve to further inform the analysis of each of the four network 
models presented in this study. 
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IV. THE BIG PICTURE 
The simple fact is, Mr. Ambassador, that average Americans, in their 
natural state . . . are the best ambassadors a country can have. . . . They are 
not suspicious, they are eager to share their skills, they are generous. But 
something happens to most Americans when they go abroad. Many of 
them are not average . . . they are second-raters. Many of them, against 
their own judgment, feel that they must live up to their commissaries and 
big cars and cocktail parties. But get an unaffected American, sir, and you 
have an asset. And if you get one, treasure him—keep him out of the 
cocktail circuit, away from bureaucrats, and let him work in his own way. 
             – Magsaysay to Gilbert MacWhite, U.S. Ambassador to Sarkhan47 
Prior to delving into an in-depth analysis of each of the networks presented from 
The Ugly American, it is beneficial to present a visualization of the entire aggregated 
network as a starting point. As illustrated in Figure 7, by the conclusion of the book (and 
shortly before his termination) the U.S. Ambassador to Sarkhan, Gilbert MacWhite, has 
developed an extensive network consisting of individuals who have successfully proven 
their ability to create their own networks and influence local populations from the 
ground-level up (i.e., Homer Atkins, Father Finian, and Colonel Hillandale). While 
Ambassador MacWhite has sought out and developed ties with these change agents, the 
subnetworks that they generate are not directly tied to formal U.S. or Sarkhanese 
governmental or diplomatic efforts to influence the Sarkhanese population. They 
therefore meet the previously presented definition of grey networks. Each of the 
subnetworks generated through the American change agents, as well as MacWhite’s 
larger network, will be described in subsequent chapters based on their unique approach 
to network development and influencing specific populations.    
                                                 
47 Lederer and Burdick, The Ugly American, 108.  
  34 
 
Figure 7.  The Aggregate Network 
 
Table 2.   Attribute Legend for NetDraw Visualizations 
A. AMBASSADOR LOUIS SEARS 
MacWhite’s extended network can be compared to the less-than-ideal network 
formed by his predecessor, Louis Sears, whose close-knit, “provincial” network (see 
Figure 8) never manifested the ability to impact the population of Sarkhan or even to 
fully comprehend the problem-set presented by the Communist movement to overthrow 
the Sarkhanese regime.48  Moreover, Ambassador Sears never realized that his embassy 
had been infiltrated by Communist agents and, although exposed to several of the 
individuals that MacWhite would eventually empower to great effect, Sears refused to 
                                                 
48 For a discussion of the distinctions between less-dense, “cosmopolitan” networks and close-knit, 
“provincial” networks, see Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 138–141. 
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entertain the idea that his top-down, resourced-based initiatives were not sufficient to 
counter proactive, localized Communist entrepreneurship in the struggle for influence 
over the Sarkhanese population. His parochial staff often echoed his ethnocentric 
worldview and any detractors who happened to suggest that there might be more to the 
situation (who Sears denounced as “crackpot internationalists”) were quickly 
marginalized and even recommended for replacement. As Sears continued to believe that 
“Sarkhan is more firmly than ever on the side of America,” Communist agents were 
successfully fomenting unrest and presenting Communism as a panacea for all of the 
hardships that the capitalist West was supposedly complicit in forcing on the Sarkhanese 
people.   
 
Figure 8.  Ambassador Sears’ Extended Network 
B. THE OTHER CHANGE AGENTS 
At least three additional change agents are directly or indirectly enlisted into the 
broader network that MacWhite engineers in The Ugly American:  A U.S. Army officer 
from Texas, the wife of the Ugly American, and a former OSS operative who had 
parachuted into Sarkhan during World War II to conduct sabotage operations against 
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1. Major James Wolchek 
Major James “Tex” Wolchek is a U.S. Army observer attached to the French 
Foreign Legion in Indochina when Ambassador MacWhite meets him during one of his 
fact-finding trips around Southeast Asia. For several weeks, Major Wolchek and the 
ambassador, along with Wolchek’s French counterpart, Major Monet, discuss the 
Communist situation in Indochina at length. MacWhite accompanies Wolchek and 
Monet’s Legionnaire company as the French struggle to find a way to apply their 
advantage in firepower and numerical strength against the elusive Viet Minh guerrillas. 
The men study the writings of Mao Tse-tung in an effort to develop an appreciation for 
the unconventional tactics being used by the Communist guerrillas against French and 
Vietnamese soldiers. The Legionnaires eventually adopt some of Mao’s tactics and use 
them against the Viet Minh guerrillas with considerable success. Predictably, the French 
generals running the war in Indochina refuse to accept the junior officer’s pleas (and 
those of Ambassador MacWhite) to re-look how the war is being fought. Near the end of 
MacWhite’s visit, the French sign an armistice and hand over Hanoi to the Viet Minh. 
MacWhite eventually gets Wolchek to Sarkhan to help oversee the training of the 
Sarkhanese military in guerrilla tactics, but the text does not reveal how MacWhite got 
him to Sarkhan or provide any detail about what Wolchek actually does when he gets 
there. 
2. Emma Atkins 
The wife of the Ugly American, Emma Atkins, not only directly influences the 
success of her husband’s effort to improve Sarkhanese irrigation methods (detailed in 
Chapter VI) but also considerably improves the lives of the Sarkhanese villagers by her 
own actions. Shortly after moving with her husband to the village of Chang ‘dong where 
Homer Atkins establishes his pump manufacturing business, Emma notices that the 
elderly villagers are severely stooped and all seem to be in considerable pain due to the 
bend in their backs. Emma surmises that this deformity is the result of the villagers’ use 
of brooms made from the short stalks of reeds found in the immediate vicinity of Chang 
‘dong. Wood was scarce in the region and the elders of the village had always assumed 
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that their advanced age was the main reason for their hunched posture, not their use of a 
two-foot long broom handle. Emma eventually locates a longer reed growing forty miles 
from Chang ‘dong that she brings back to the village and plants near her home.  
Rather than trying to force the new broom handles on the local population, Emma 
simply uses the longer broom handle herself while cleaning around her house. She is 
eventually approached by several villagers who ask her about her new tool. Emma tells 
the villagers where they can find the new reeds and they promptly retrieve enough to 
make sure that they will no longer have to bend over to sweep. Interestingly, four years 
after the Atkins return to the United States, Emma receives a letter from the village 
headman of Chang ‘dong informing her that the villagers have erected a shrine in her 
honor and that they wanted to let her know how much she had improved their lives (there 
is no mention of any homage paid to Homer).  
3. John Colvin 
Another change agent that Ambassador MacWhite accepts into his network is 
John Colvin, a former OSS operative who served in Sarkhan during World War II. Colvin 
devises a plan to gradually introduce a particular breed of cattle into Sarkhan that can 
digest the tough, thick grasses that carpet the country’s hillsides.   The cattle could graze 
on vast tracts of otherwise unusable land and would both improve the local diet and 
bolster the regional economy. Colvin plans to get the Sarkhanese to eventually accept the 
cattle into their everyday lives by first introducing them to powdered milk. A year after 
he opened the first of several milk distribution centers in Sarkhan, Colvin hoped to begin 
importing the cattle to provide fresh milk and byproducts to the population. He then 
intended to sell his stake in the operation and return to the United States.   
In contrast to the other change agents presented in this study, Colvin’s efforts are 
entirely his own and are not part of a larger attempt to develop an indigenous network. 
His manner is most similar to that of Colonel Hillandale who chooses to forego the use of 
a local proxy and instead presents himself and his own actions as a primary means of 
influence. However, Colvin’s endeavor centers on the production of a tangible product 
(i.e., milk and cattle) while Hillandale focuses on the production of intangible social 
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capital. Hillandale builds personal relationships and provides indigenous populations with 
an American that they can identify with. Colvin simply wants to progressively and 
gradually introduce a product that will help the Sarkhanese people. His solitary approach 
serves as a useful comparison to the other network models and a viable course of action 
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V. THE ORCHESTRATOR 
The little things we do must be moral acts and they must be done in the 
real interest of the peoples whose friendship we need—not just in the 
interest of propaganda. . . . to the extent that our foreign policy is humane 
and reasonable, it will be successful. To the extent that it is imperialistic 
and grandiose, it will fail.                                   
– Ambassador MacWhite49 
A. NETWORK BACKGROUND50 
The Honorable Gilbert MacWhite, United States Ambassador to Sarkhan, is one 
of the few characters that maintain a recurring role throughout The Ugly American. 
Although not the work’s title character, MacWhite serves as the book’s principal 
protagonist, intent on using a culturally attuned approach and his skill as a veteran 
Foreign Service officer to assist the people of Sarkhan. Sarkhan finds itself at the center 
of the Cold War ideological struggle between the capitalist West and the Soviet-led 
Communist bloc—a struggle that the Communists are winning when MacWhite assumes 
his position in part due to his predecessor’s poorly executed ambassadorial mission 
(described above in Chapter IV). MacWhite faces entrenched local Communist agents, 
entrepreneurial Russian diplomats, a largely incompetent American embassy staff, and a 
detached and unimaginative bureaucracy back in Washington as he fights to regain 
influence among the predominantly rural and agrarian Sarkhanese population. Through 
dedicated study of local and regional issues, Communist methodologies, and various 
successful approaches used in other parts of Southeast Asia, MacWhite devises a long-
term plan for the country and is able to slowly cobble together an extended network of 
individuals (i.e., the change agents) who prove effective at stemming the progress of the 
Communist movement in Sarkhan.   
                                                 
49 Lederer and Burdick, The Ugly American, 267. 
50 Ambassador MacWhite’s aggregate network was extracted from chapters 1–5, 10, 15, 17, 18, and 
21 in The Ugly American. While every character that appears in the text is not included here, key 
relationships that are critical to the theories and analysis presented throughout this work have been coded 
according to the metrics defined in Chapter III. The three additional change agents introduced in the 
previous chapter have the potential to yield additional implications relevant to host nation network 
development in the course of future research. 
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Unfortunately, MacWhite’s somewhat unorthodox measures are not appreciated 
by his superiors in the State Department, and his efforts are ultimately cut short. He is 
abruptly recalled back to the United States after his boss rejects his demands for a major 
restructuring of how his embassy was to conduct operations.51 The Ugly American 
emphasizes the irony of MacWhite’s dismissal after he had made considerable gains in 
improving America’s status in Sarkhan and was well on his way to dramatically 
disrupting Communist designs on the region. The removal of the effective diplomat, 
MacWhite, when juxtaposed with Ambassador Sears receiving the federal judgeship he 
desired and the replacement of MacWhite by the ostentatious and culturally inept Joe 
Bing, serves as the authors’ most glaring illustration of what they perceived as a 
tremendous misappropriation of resources and talent in the execution of U.S. foreign 
policy. 
                                                 
51 Ambassador MacWhite informed the Secretary of State that he would tender his resignation if five 
conditions for restructuring his ambassadorial mission were not approved. His ultimatum required that:  1) 
all embassy personnel complete at least twelve weeks of Sarkhanese language instruction; 2) no dependent 
travel be approved for embassy employees serving less than a two year assignment; 3) the American 
commissary and Post Exchange (PX) be withdrawn from Sarkhan (he insisted that embassy personnel 
should live off of the local economy); 4) privately owned vehicles of embassy personnel no longer be 
permitted in Sarkhan; and 5) all embassy personnel must read the writings of the major Communist 
theorists and leaders prior to traveling to Sarkhan. 
  41 
B. NETWORK OVERVIEW 
 
Figure 9.  Ambassador MacWhite’s Extended Network 
Figure 9 provides a NetDraw generated visualization of a portion of the 
relationships that Ambassador MacWhite develops throughout The Ugly American. 
While this sociogram does not include all of the actors the ambassador interacts with in 
the book, the aggregate network presented here (along with the three subnetwork 
analyses contained in this study) serves both to illustrate the value of SNA as an 
analytical tool and to assist in further revealing the poignant and still relevant lessons 
contained in the text. All six of the formal and informal ties defined in Chapter III are 
included in this sociogram.  
The dense clique in the center of the graph consisting of eight red squares and two 
blue triangles represents the key characters in the U.S. embassy subnetwork. The six blue 
squares to the left of the embassy subgroup are the inner circle of the Sarkhanese national 
government. The three subnetworks that are examined later in this study are outlined in 
green (Colonel Hillandale), blue (Homer Atkins), and grey (Father Finian). Also depicted 
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are two Russians, Ambassador Louis Krupitzyn and Vladimir Vinich (a veteran political 
agent charged with leading Communist activities in Burma), and several other tangential 
characters that are indirectly associated with the various subnetworks. Finally, the three 
change agents discussed in the previous chapter who are not analyzed in detail in this 
study are circled in orange. 
C. NETWORK ANALYSIS  
 
Figure 10.  Ambassador MacWhite’s Network Design 
1. Level of Openness 
In contrast to the closed embassy network that was cultivated by the previous 
ambassador to Sarkhan, Ambassador MacWhite purposefully sought out key individuals 
who he believed could assist him in countering Communist efforts to pull Sarkhan into 
the Sino-Soviet domain. He adopted two new approaches in his quest to broaden the 
scope of American influence that would eventually be used against him as his superiors 
back in Washington began questioning his unconventional methods. First, MacWhite 
recognized that he needed help and actively sought the advice of a handful of his 
indigenous Southeast Asian counterparts who had been dealing with Communist 
aggression in their own countries for some time. Two of the change agents that 
MacWhite would eventually recruit were recommended to him during these meetings. 
Secondly, MacWhite believed that the best way for him to improve his understanding of 
the Communist situation in Sarkhan was to travel throughout the region and experience 
first-hand what nations at various stages of Communist insurrection looked like. During 
  43 
his travels, MacWhite was exposed to several other individuals who further shaped his 
approach in Sarkhan. He even managed to convince two of them, Homer Atkins and 
Major Wolchek, to join his network.   
Despite his willingness to incorporate a diverse assortment of individuals into his 
network, MacWhite understood that there were risks associated with his counter-
Communist campaign. The network faced challenges both from Communist sympathizers 
who actively sought to derail its activities and from a large portion of the Foreign Service 
community who wished to maintain the status quo and did not recognize MacWhite’s 
efforts as necessary or appropriate in the broader context of executing U.S. foreign 
policy. Recruitment into the network, therefore, was open to a wide range of innovative, 
proactive characters but was also tempered by MacWhite’s desire to maintain overall 
operational security of his comprehensive efforts and his insistence on personally 
establishing a foundation of person-based trust with each of the change agents that he 
brought on board.52 
2. Level of Formality 
While MacWhite’s extended network was not bounded by formal standards and 
procedures, he understood that the literal and figurative space that the network occupied 
still existed within the context of his overall diplomatic mission.53  Those change agents 
that operated out of the U.S. embassy, for instance, could not simply ignore the 
constraints placed upon them by bureaucratic procedure or the ineptitude of other 
Americans serving in Sarkhan, they had to deal with them and work their way around 
them. MacWhite did endeavor, however, to grant the change agents as much freedom of 
action and delegation of authority as was feasible for someone in his position. This 
conscious decision to orchestrate a network of networks (i.e., those of the change 
agents), rather than to micro-manage the affairs of the various activities that were being 
                                                 
52 Person-based trust is often characterized in trust literature as originating primarily from an 
individual’s favorable assessment of the trustee’s competence, benevolence, and integrity. See Adams and 
Webb, “Trust in Small Military Teams,” 5–6. 
53 For a discussion of the “locus” of networks, which includes the real place or virtual space that an 
individual network occupies, see Anklam, Net Work, 81–88. 
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undertaken, allowed each subnetwork to flourish and each change agent to use his or her 
own unique approach to its fullest capacity.54  MacWhite recognized that this 
methodology produced a greater number and wider variance of direct challenges to 
Communist expansionism than he could have created on his own. As will be discussed in 
detail below, this informal network structure was not without its weaknesses, particularly 
in matters of resilience at both the local level in Sarkhan and within the broader context 
of the larger diplomatic effort in which the network ultimately operated.  
3. Level of Planning  
MacWhite’s extended network can be characterized as slightly more emergent 
than planned primarily due to his decision to not dictate the manner in which each of the 
subnetworks executed their individual tasks. The overarching goal of exposing the 
Sarkhanese population to a wide array of programs championed by Americans and 
promoting Western ideals was ultimately geared at disrupting Communist efforts to do 
the same thing for the Soviet cause. This purpose, however, was not central to all of the 
subnetworks, nor was it necessary for all of the change agents to be dedicated anti-
Communists. Homer Atkins, the focus of Chapter VI, and Tom Knox, an agricultural 
advisor working in Cambodia, approached their tasks from a purely altruistic position and 
were intent on using their education and expertise to find simple, locally sustainable 
solutions to basic problems impacting the indigenous populations of Southeast Asia. 
Their contributions substantially improved local conditions and, by extension, increased 
America’s standing in the eyes of the people while contravening much of the anti-
Western Communist propaganda directed at the masses that depicted Americans as 
uncaring, xenophobic capitalists. Unlike Father Finian and John Colvin, however, Atkins 
and Knox were not risking their lives and livelihood in Southeast Asia solely to impede 
the spread of Communism—they were there simply to help people who could use their 
assistance. Ambassador MacWhite recognized the “second-order” effects of these types 
of efforts and co-opted their use within the larger planned purpose of his extended 
network.    
                                                 
54 For Anklam’s description of the role of choreographers and orchestrators in network design, see 
Anklam, Net Work, 137–138. 
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Table 3.   MacWhite’s Network Summary 
D. IMPLICATIONS 
1. Weak Ties  
During the development of Ambassador MacWhite’s extended network, it is 
evident that his reliance on “weak” ties is significant to the greater realization of the U.S. 
government’s potential to impact the Sarkhanese population. Granovetter suggests that 
the strength of an interpersonal tie is directly related to “the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy…and the reciprocal services which characterize the 
tie.”55  MacWhite’s “weak” connections to Homer Atkins, Father Finian, and John 
Colvin (all of whom prove to be influential change agents) are all founded on a 
considerable amount of trust that is established in a relatively short amount of time based 
primarily on MacWhite’s personal research, input from local nationals, and his 
willingness to support their efforts to help the people of Sarkhan. 
                                                 
55 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1361. 
• Defeat Communist attempts to overthrow the government of Sarkhan Purpose 
• Federated Structure 
• Geographically expanded 
• More open 
• Discovery and knowledge-based facilitation 
Style 
• Regionally attuned, effective counters to Communist political entrepreneurship 
Value 
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Anklam suggests that network structures with “extensive weak ties to diverse 
groups” are ideal for innovation and “learning networks” (see Table 4).56  Network 
members who have close personal and professional connections (i.e., strong ties) tend to 
think along similar lines and have access to the same resources.57  By purposefully 
seeking out new ideas and involvement from external actors and then consciously 
keeping these new network members at arm’s length, MacWhite allows the subnetworks 
to learn and grow on their own and in ways that would not have been feasible if he would 
have taken a more direct and personal involvement in their evolution. While MacWhite’s 
relationship to Colonel Hillandale might be considered a “strong” tie based on their work 
together in the U.S. Embassy, MacWhite does not interfere with Hillandale’s efforts in 
Sarkhan and therefore refrains from imposing the constraints that could easily arise from 
MacWhite’s authoritative relationship to Hillandale. 
 
Table 4.   Structural Patterns for Different Network Functions58 
                                                 
56 Anklam, Net Work, 78. 
57 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, 158. 
58 Anklam, Net Work, 78. The table presented is a modified version of the table from Net Work that the 
author used in a May 2010 presentation titled “Creating and Sustaining Successful Networks.” From 
http://www.slideshare.net/panklam/net-work-creating-and-sustaining-successful-networks. 
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2. Empowering Orchestration   
MacWhite’s decision to orchestrate rather than direct his network presents a 
viable, if somewhat oversimplified, model for network designers to consider when 
working with foreign populations. In addition to Anklam’s apt analogy of orchestration, 
other notable authors have recently explored leadership roles in social movements and 
networks in ways that offer added insight into Ambassador MacWhite’s approach to 
network development.   
Gladwell’s “law of the few” is part of a larger “influentials hypothesis” that posits 
that certain people possess a unique capacity to affect the lives of others—far more so 
than the average person.59  In his book, The Tipping Point, Gladwell separates these 
influential people into three categories—connectors, mavens, and salesmen.60  MacWhite 
is neither a “maven” (a recognized expert who actively accumulates knowledge in his 
chosen field and is relied upon by others to inform their decisions) nor a “salesman” (one 
skilled in the art of persuasion); what he is good at is actively seeking out people who 
then connect him to other people who can assist him in his efforts—he connects with 
connectors. He engineers his role as the central hub in his network and grows it through 
numerous relationships that he establishes and exploits throughout his travels. In doing 
so, he exemplifies the characteristics of another archetype described in a recent study of 
“leaderless” organizations—that of the catalyst. 
In The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless 
Organizations, Brafman and Beckstrom define a catalyst as any person who initiates a 
decentralized organization without hierarchy or structure and then “fades away into the 
background.”61 MacWhite did not intend to depart Sarkhan as early as he did but it is 
evident that the extended network he created during his tenure was intended to persist—
although, as previously discussed, he arguably could have done more to ensure its 
survival.   Throughout the evolution of his network, Ambassador MacWhite uses several 
                                                 
59 Watts, “Challenging the Influentials,” 202–203. 
60 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, 30–88. 
61 Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of 
Leaderless Organizations (New York: Portfolio, 2006), 88, 90, 92. 
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of the catalyst’s tools that Brafman and Beckstrom describe in their work. Among the 
most notable are:  1) a genuine interest in others, 2) loose connections (i.e., weak ties); 3) 
meeting people where they are; 4) trusting the network; 5) a tolerance for ambiguity; 6) a 
hands-off approach; and 7) the ability to recede and let the network grow after the initial 
framework is established. Finally, a useful comparison for network designers between 
catalysts and more authoritarian leaders (i.e., “CEOs”) like Ambassador Sears is shown 
in Figure 11.    
 
Figure 11.  The Catalyst versus the CEO62 
3. Network Design and Resilience   
Designers who are intent on developing indigenous networks must realize the 
unique circumstances and opportunities that present themselves in each particular 
situation. MacWhite’s larger agenda of countering the spread of Communist propaganda 
and influence was subsumed, yet eventually bolstered, by the individualized and 
narrower focus of each of the subnetworks. The “federated” network structure that 
emerged is characterized by the core of the extended network (in this case, MacWhite 
                                                 
62 From Brafman and Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider, 130. 
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himself) serving as the central hub around which other relatively autonomous hubs (i.e., 
the change agents) are arranged.63 This method worked in Sarkhan where there had not 
been any notable American efforts to help the people and any enterprise that made 
contact with the masses was a step in the right direction. MacWhite could see that 
initiatives aimed at improving farming techniques or educational opportunities (Father 
Finian’s contribution in Sarkhan), for instance, could have dramatic indirect effects on 
Communist expansion. The results might not have been the same in another region of the 
world and, importantly, MacWhite’s work was somewhat incomplete in that the network 
was not fully prepared to continue to function upon his unexpected removal.  
MacWhite’s central role in the overall development of his network is undoubtedly 
a weakness that should be addressed. Without a clear understanding of an overall purpose 
and goal for each of the subnetworks present in his larger network, MacWhite’s removal 
had the potential to dramatically degrade U.S. assistance to the people of Sarkhan—no 
one else knew where he wanted to take things or at what point they could consider their 
efforts a success. However, when compared to MacWhite’s predecessor’s close-knit, 
“provincial” network (see Figure 12),64 it is apparent that the expanded vision that 
MacWhite brought to the Sarkhanese situation stood a much greater chance of actually 
proving effective, regardless of the larger issues of sustainability.   
                                                 
63 Anklam, Net Work, 67. 
64 Negative relations appear as dotted lines in this Pajek sociogram. 
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Figure 12.  Pajek Visualization of Ambassador Sears’ Network 
Establishing redundancy and a greater shared understanding of the role each of 
the actors assumed within the network could certainly have added to its resiliency.65  
Unfortunately, MacWhite’s frustrations with the state of the Foreign Service community, 
his frequent travel, and his overtaxed schedule contributed to him missing several 
opportunities to further strengthen the network during its development. Perhaps a 
concerted effort early in his tenure to find and vet a trusted second-in-command or even 
to assemble a close-knit staff that shared his approach to de-centralized, population-
centric initiatives and his anti-Communist agenda could have enabled the network to 
continue to grow and achieve its desired effects upon his departure.   
Network designers operating within a larger context or at the behest of a parent 
organization (e.g., the Department of State) should also ensure that the methods 
                                                 
65 Zolli and Healy note that while redundancy (“the ability of a system to persist even when 
compromised”) is not synonymous with resiliency (“the capacity of a system, enterprise, or person to 
maintain its core purpose and integrity in the face of dramatically changed circumstances”), it is frequently 
a principal component of highly resilient systems. Additional principles of resiliency include:  diversity, 
simplicity, trust and cooperation, adaptive governance, and the ability to self-organize to “heal in the wake 
of a breach.”  MacWhite’s network design approach contained many of the qualities that are helpful in 
establishing systemic resilience. However, while focusing so much of his attention on getting the network 
off the ground, he never made a concerted effort to align these characteristics towards the goal of preparing 
the network for a disruption.   Zolli and Healy, Resilience, 6–16. 
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employed either fit into the accepted practices of the parent organization or can be 
explained in such a way that the parent organization does not interfere with the network’s 
emergence or administration. MacWhite’s approach ran counter to what the authors 
viewed as the commonly accepted practices of the Foreign Service in the 
mid–20th century. Partly because he truly viewed his efforts as necessary and effective 
and partly due to his frustration with the way foreign policy was being executed, 
MacWhite was either unable or unwilling to devise a viable way to placate his superiors 
in Washington while accomplishing his work in Sarkhan. The result was that his network 
faced disruption not only from Communist agents in Sarkhan but also from bureaucrats in 
the U.S. government. Those bureaucrats ultimately possessed the power to impact the 
network to a far greater extent than any of the challenges MacWhite and the other change 
agents faced on the ground in Sarkhan—the State Department sent MacWhite home. 
4. Letting Go to Get More   
Despite the considerable emphasis placed on cross-cultural understanding and 
linguistic capabilities in recent years, Americans continue to face multi-dimensional and 
often distinctly localized conditions that challenge even the most experienced and 
knowledgeable advisors, non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, and Foreign 
Service professionals. Allowing innovative initiatives the latitude to address these 
localized challenges without dictating their actions undoubtedly poses risks to those 
charged with overseeing the execution of foreign policy and on whose shoulders success 
or failure ultimately rests. In some ways, the “zero-defect” mentality that exists today is 
not all too different from the narrow, domestically-oriented mentality of Ambassador 
Sears, Joe Bing, and several other antagonists presented in The Ugly American. Today’s 
leaders operating on foreign soil might possess a far greater capacity to execute their 
responsibilities but the potential ramifications of just one mistake or the lack of 
quantifiable signs of “progress” contribute to a similar mind-set that influenced many of 
the characters in The Ugly American to ignore the realities on the ground, isolate 
themselves from the local population, and hope to return to the United States without 
being associated with any negative incidents. This condition often manifests itself in risk 
aversion and micro-management by those administrators who have the unenviable task of 
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approving a wide range of regional or local programs without the ability to personally 
oversee them or, in some cases, to even be able to fully grasp the fundamentals of a 
specific approach. Without the de-centralized, trust-based foundations of a more 
adhocratic organization—like those present in MacWhite’s network—comprehensive 
efforts to bring change or to influence populations will be shackled by the limits of the 
imagination and the individual proclivities of the man or woman in charge. As 
MacWhite’s character illustrates, one person can only do so much.     
While the federated structure that MacWhite developed based on weak ties, 
proactive recruitment, and a de-centralized approach to network governance might not be 
the “right” fit for all attempts at indigenous network development, the method deserves 
consideration and undoubtedly contains beneficial lessons for those attempting the 
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VI. THE CONFEDERATE 
You want big industry. You want big factories. You want big T.V.A.’s 
scattered all over the countryside. That all takes skilled workmen, and 
mines, and a lot of money, and a whole lot of people who are production-
minded. Of course you’ve got good people out there in the boondocks, 
good hardworking people who are plenty savvy. But they don’t want what 
you want yet. It takes time for that. That’s why I recommended in my 
report that you start small, with little things. And then after you lick them, 
go on to the bigger things.                
–Homer Atkins (the Ugly American)66 
 
A. NETWORK BACKGROUND67 
Homer Atkins is the title character of The Ugly American. He epitomizes what 
Americans are capable of accomplishing when truly and imaginatively committing 
themselves to working with indigenous populations. Homer’s ugliness is literal, not 
figurative, and his actions are in no way reflective of the negative connotations associated 
with the modern colloquial meaning that the pejorative “ugly American” has come to 
denote.68 The example that Homer provides stands in stark contrast to the insouciant, 
bourgeois demeanor of men like Ambassador Sears and Joe Bing who appear in the 
novel—characters inspired by real men who unfortunately hijacked Homer’s moniker and 
robbed generations of Americans working overseas of a simple metaphorical goal to 
strive for:  to be like the ugly American.  
 Homer is a retired American engineer who answers a State Department recruiting 
drive promising the opportunity of overseas service. He is assigned as an engineering 
advisor in Vietnam and spends the first ten months of his tour surveying the countryside, 
                                                 
66 Lederer and Burdick, The Ugly American, 208. 
67 Homer Atkins’ network was extracted from chapters 17, 18, and 21 in The Ugly American. 
68 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary currently defines an “ugly American” as “an American in a 
foreign country whose behavior is offensive to the people of that country.”  The Encarta Dictionary 
elaborates further by describing an “ugly American” as “a loud, boorish, nationalistic American, especially 
one traveling abroad, who is regarded as conforming to a stereotype that gives Americans a bad 
reputation.” 
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living among the locals, and gaining an appreciation for the needs of the indigenous 
population. By the time Ambassador MacWhite meets Atkins at a conference in Saigon, 
Homer’s efforts to assist the people of Vietnam have been repeatedly frustrated by 
American, French, and Vietnamese diplomats who are not interested in what Homer 
believes are the truly important issues facing the greater Vietnamese population. Homer’s 
recommendations to pursue smaller projects that have the potential to address local 
grievances and improve the Vietnamese quality of life are brushed aside in favor of large-
scale, national-level infrastructure development and proposals for increased military 
spending.   
Ambassador MacWhite observes the bureaucrats in Saigon rejecting Atkins’ plea 
for the delegation to approve the construction of brick factories, quarries, canning plants, 
and smaller, non-military grade roadways designed for improving commerce and access 
to resources, not for moving large military equipment between major population centers. 
While Homer does not completely discount the value of dams, utility projects, airfields, 
and other large-scale endeavors, he insists that those projects should be pursued at a later 
date, after more immediate concerns that are affecting the Vietnamese people have been 
addressed. A more measured approach would allow enough time for an improved 
Vietnamese infrastructure and education system to set the conditions for the Vietnamese, 
not foreign companies, to assume responsibility for these bigger projects when the time 
came for them to be initiated. The assembly of urban elite decision-makers—none of 
whom had ventured out among the people to actually assess the situation for 
themselves—rejects all of Homer’s advice. Disgusted by the delegation’s lack of insight, 
Homer decides he has finally had enough and walks out of the meeting. Ambassador 
MacWhite seizes on this unexpected opportunity, invites Homer for a drink, and 
successfully convinces him to bring his skills and needs-based approach to Sarkhan.     
Atkins and his wife, Emma, eventually travel to a rural region of Sarkhan where 
he works to develop a new pump for irrigating farmland. As MacWhite had explained to 
Homer shortly after they met in Vietnam, the rolling countryside of Sarkhan made it 
difficult to transport water from low-lying water sources up to the hillside paddies where 
Sarkhanese farmers planted their crops. MacWhite believed that Homer might be able to 
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use his engineering skills to devise a more efficient irrigation method than the traditional 
practice of using primitive dip lifts to water the fields. Soon after his arrival in Sarkhan, 
Homer completes a design for a rudimentary pump that he believes has the potential to 
vastly improve Sarkhanese irrigation techniques.   
Homer, with Emma’s help, proves adept not only at engineering a locally 
sustainable solution to the irrigation problem but also at engineering an ingenious 
approach to getting his network started and his idea approved and endorsed by the local 
population. First, at Emma’s behest, Homer travels to the remote village of Chang ‘dong 
and initiates his endeavor by meeting with the village headman. Through negotiations 
with the headman and the village elders, Atkins finds an indigenous counterpart (a local 
engineer named Jeepo) who is capable of assisting Homer in finalizing his design and 
implementing his plans for producing the pump. Secondly, Atkins insists up front that a 
business contract is agreed to that splits any profits made in the manufacture of the pump 
equitably between Atkins and any Sarkhanese directly involved in the enterprise. Jeepo 
later adds specific provisions to the contract that stipulate that the design will not be 
patented and that the newly formed Jeepo-Atkins Company will make the pump design 
available to all of Sarkhan by printing design schematics and distributing them 
throughout the countryside.   
A third occurrence that aided the network’s emergence was completely 
unanticipated. Emma had suggested to Homer that bicycles, which were ubiquitous in 
Sarkhan, could be used as the pump’s source of power. Homer followed Emma’s advice 
and the pump—consisting now of bamboo piping, a pumping mechanism fashioned out 
of pistons and cylinders from the engine blocks of abandoned jeeps (which were also in 
great supply), some simple mechanical linkages, and a modified bicycle frame to power 
the entire apparatus—appeared ready to be put to use. What the couple had not 
anticipated, however, was that there was probably no more important mechanical device 
to the average Sarkhanese than a fully functioning bicycle. There were no spare bicycles 
that could be put out of commission as a means of transportation in order to power the 
pumps. Jeepo, Homer’s local engineer, fixed this design flaw by devising a rack and 
treadmill system that allowed a bicycle to be fitted to the pump temporarily and then 
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easily removed when the bicycle’s owner needed it to travel. Because of Jeepo’s 
contribution, the Sarkhanese were now not only directly invested in the pump’s 
manufacture and sale, but they also could legitimately claim to have played a major role 
in the pump’s evolution and in the development of its final design.69      
1. A Note on Homer’s “Ugliness” 
 Long before Homer first journeyed to Asia he had developed a habit of 
looking at his calloused, freckled hands to remind himself that he was an ugly man. He 
looked at his hands often when meeting with government officials or corporate 
executives who seemed predisposed to casually disregard input from someone like 
Homer who did not share their well-groomed comportment and willingness to not buck 
the system. Homer was neither well-groomed nor a yes-man. He was different, and he 
begrudgingly embraced his differences and used them to his advantage. Homer’s frequent 
hand-checking constantly reminded him of his outsider status; it also forced him to take 
pause and to think more about what he would like to say and how he might best approach 
a particular situation. He assumed that he could not rely on charm, charisma, or physical 
attractiveness to get people to listen to him or to manipulate them into doing what he felt 
needed to be done. He had to work hard, know what he was talking about, and carefully 
navigate negotiations if he wanted to get his way.   
The unique qualities that the authors bestow upon Homer Atkins present an ideal, 
if not archetypal, mentality for those involved in host nation network development to 
aspire to. Too often and too easily, Americans working overseas may view their way as 
the “only” way, are more concerned with appearances than with substance, or are 
unwilling to speak up when they believe things are not being done the way they should 
                                                 
69 Jeepo’s contribution to the irrigation pump’s final design illustrates a commonly oversimplified 
dictum of foreign advising that appears in T. E. Lawrence’s famous “Twenty-Seven Articles.”  Article 15 
counsels:  “Do not try to do too much with your own hands...your practical work will not be as good as, 
perhaps, you think it is.”  Homer’s “practical work” went far in developing a viable improvement to 
Sarkhanese irrigation methods. However, for the design to truly be practical in Sarkhan, it needed Jeepo’s 
input. Americans intent on host nation network development must be cautious in their approach to devising 
solutions to local problems—an overreliance on technology, the introduction of esoteric methodologies, or 
an unwillingness to accept input from the indigenous population can all contribute to the failure of even the 
most well-intentioned, if myopic, attempts to provide goods or services to indigenous peoples. For the full 
text of Lawrence’s “Twenty-Seven Articles,” see John E. Mack, A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T. 
E. Lawrence (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), 463–467. 
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be. It is truly unfortunate that the lessons contained in Homer’s ugliness have been 
largely overshadowed by the misappropriation of his apt and illustrative title. More 
American men and women serving on foreign soil should strive to follow Homer’s 
example and remind themselves, as often as he did, to pause and take a true account of 
what they are trying to accomplish and how they might best approach their tasks. 
The physical ugliness that separates Homer from the apathetic and often 
ostentatious diplomats that he encounters in Asia (who represent the modern perception 
of “ugly Americans”) can also be viewed as symbolic of the cultural divide that 
inescapably separates even the most seasoned Foreign Service worker from a host nation 
population. No matter how familiar or knowledgeable an external change agent may 
become with an indigenous population, he or she will always be an outsider. Americans 
working with foreign populations would do well to remind themselves of their 
“ugliness”—their cultural and often physical foreignness as viewed through the eyes of 
native populations. Indeed, the habit of many Americans who refuse to accept that they 
are interlopers and should avoid patronizing or offending the very people they are trying 
to assist contributed to the unfortunate idiomatic misrepresentation of what it means to be 
an “ugly American.” 
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B. NETWORK OVERVIEW  
 
Figure 13.  The Jeepo-Atkins Company Network 
Figure 13 depicts Homer’s network following his negotiations with the leaders of 
the village of Chang ‘dong (the three blue triangles at left-center) that led to his 
partnership with Jeepo. Homer and Jeepo, with permission from the village headman, 
form the Jeepo-Atkins Company (the dense core at center) and hire 12 local workers who 
both manufacture the pumps at the company’s warehouse in Chang ‘dong and assume the 
role of salesmen to market the pump across the region. The sociogram depicts Homer’s 
network as the 12 salesmen have each departed Chang ‘dong with two sample pumps and 
started to sell their product.70  Business, advice, and trust ties were utilized to produce 
this network. 
                                                 
70 Although the text of the book does not detail exactly how many contacts were made by the 
individual salesmen, it does relate that the first salesman to return to Chang ‘dong had sold his two samples 
and received orders for eight more pumps. Rather than attempting to extrapolate the business ties created 
based on this sole account, for the purposes of this coding it is assumed that each of the salesmen was at 
least able to make contact with two farmers and sell the sample pumps that he had departed with. 
Subsequent depictions of Chang ‘dong do not describe the exact extent of the success of the company but 
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C. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 14.  Homer Atkins’ Network Design 
1. Level of Openness   
Membership in Homer’s network was somewhat constrained by his desire to 
produce a tangible product (i.e., pumps) for the Sarkhanese people. Prior to departing for 
Chang ‘dong Homer had developed the basic design for the pump on his own. Following 
Jeepo’s unanticipated yet necessary assistance in completing the design, the two men 
were no longer concerned with further innovation—they wanted to get the pumps built 
and put to use. The network, at that point, was closed to outside actors apart from the 
twelve Sarkhanese workers that they hired. These workers eventually opened the 
network’s membership up again to include the farmers that they interacted with as they 
travelled the countryside and sold their newly manufactured pumps. This controlled 
recruitment limited the influx of new ideas and the discovery of new problems (what 
might be considered a critical capability of other networks) but was effective at 
methodically expanding the reach of the network by providing practical, affordable 
assistance through indigenous channels in the form of a locally derived and locally 
sustainable product.   
The birth of the Jeepo-Atkins Company further reveals the closed nature of 
Homer’s network design model. For Homer’s approach to work, a discrete group of men, 
the village elders, had to be convinced to not only support the project but also to provide 
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Homer with a proxy (Jeepo) who was a capable engineer willing to help Homer get the 
network off the ground. The village headman could easily have chosen a less-qualified 
family member who might have profited from an association with Atkins. The elders 
might also have been tempted to try to sabotage the effort in any manner of ways to 
discredit the American entrepreneur. The Sarkhanese had never witnessed a white man 
actually working with his hands and suspected that Homer might be trying to use them 
and the labor they provided for his own benefit at their expense. These were risks that 
Homer felt were necessary to take and without taking them his effort could not have 
succeeded the way that it did. As Emma presciently cautioned Homer before he solidified 
his plan:  “You’ve got a good machine there....But don’t think that just because it’s good 
the Sarkhanese are going to start using it right away....You have to let them use the 
machines themselves and in their own way. If you try to jam it down their throats, they’ll 
never use it.”71 
2. Level of Formality   
Homer’s network is the most formalized and least adhocratic of the four networks 
contained in this study. Homer insisted that written documents be produced to formally 
bind his agreements with the villagers of Chang ‘dong. He did this partly due to the 
inherent requirements for standardization of the manufacturing and marketing procedures 
involved in the business of selling pumps and partly as a means of establishing mutual 
trust with the local leaders and the indigenous population. The simple organizational 
structure that emerged limited the amount of innovation and knowledge sharing both 
within the network and from external actors but was efficient at creating a stable 
environment conducive to the production of a much needed product for the Sarkhanese 
people.72    
                                                 
71 Lederer and Burdick, The Ugly American, 218. 
72 Mintzberg describes the simple organizational structure as having “little or no technostructure, few 
support staffers, a loose division of labor, minimal differentiation among its units, and a small managerial 
hierarchy.”  Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 157. For additional detail concerning simple organizational 
structures as well as background on five other organizational structures (including the adhocracy), see 
Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 157–297. 
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As Anklam suggests, no network design structure is inherently superior to any 
other. The ideal design “will vary based on the purpose, style, and value-creating 
characteristics of a [particular] network.”73  The formalized, structured approach that 
Homer adopted proved to be exactly what was necessary for the Sarkhanese villagers to 
accept the help of an outsider, especially one who was attempting to modify their 
centuries-old irrigation methods. Even though the network emerged as a mesh as the 
Jeepo-Atkins Company was being formed, once the salesmen began to venture into the 
countryside, the network establishes a periphery that has the potential to bring new 
members and fresh ideas back into the network’s sphere. This type of locally legitimized, 
practical, and indigenously run mechanism for generating new stakeholders and 
expanding the reach of the network has the capacity to not only get needed assistance out 
to the people but also to serve as the foundation for the establishment of an enduring 
network capable of supporting other tasks.   
3. Level of Planning 
 While Homer deliberately and literally planned (in the form of design 
schematics) many of the steps that he would take in developing his network, there were 
several critical junctures along the way that relied on forces and factors beyond his 
immediate control. The end result of his pump design, for instance, could not have been 
anticipated when Ambassador MacWhite first challenged Homer to improve Sarkhanese 
irrigation methods while they were both in Vietnam. Homer had to be in Sarkhan so he 
could work with readily available materials that existed in sufficient quantities to support 
his task. He could not complete the plans for a practical and locally sustainable pump 
until he was actually there. Likewise, Homer could not anticipate how various inputs 
from the village elders and from Jeepo would affect the emergence of his pump-building 
network until he was actually in Chang ‘dong. He certainly had a basic plan and he had 
experience in building things and making organizations function, but the realities of the 
Jeepo-Atkins Company were different than anything he had been exposed to back in the 
                                                 
73 Anklam further reveals that “studies are showing that different structures are more or less suitable 
for different categories of work. It has become conventional wisdom...that the core/periphery model 
appears to be best for vibrant innovation...and that closed, highly connected teams are required for focused 
detail work.” Anklam, Net Work, 77–78. 
  62 
United States. Homer did not force his plan to unfold in a prescribed manner. He 
remained flexible and adapted his approach based on the resources and capabilities that 
he had on hand. 
 
Table 5.   Homer’s Network Summary 
D. IMPLICATIONS  
1. Collaboration   
Homer’s successful collaboration with Sarkhanese villagers, initiated through the 
village leadership and expanded by the villagers themselves, represents a highly 
effective, “grassroots” approach to identifying and generating stakeholders and building 
consensus with a host nation population.74  This process accomplished more than simply 
producing a pump that was acceptable and sustainable throughout the Sarkhanese 
                                                 
74 Straus defines collaboration as “the process people employ when working together in a group, 
organization, or community to plan, create, solve problems, and make decisions.”  Straus, How to Make 
Collaboration Work, 5. While this chapter focuses on Homer’s successful collaboration with the 
Sarkhanese population, the title “confederate” is utilized (instead of “collaborator”) to forego any possible 
confusion regarding the network model’s association with enemy or adversarial entities. 
• Provide inexpensive, efficient, sustainable, and locally accepted improvements to Sarkhanese agricultural production techniques 
Purpose 
• Mesh (Jeepo-Atkins Company) 
• Core/Periphery (post-product launch) 
Structure 
• Production-based (pumps) 
• More planned  
• Balanced interaction (personal, skill, and task-based) 
Style 
• Tangible financial capital; intangible social capital Value 
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countryside. It also set the foundation for future small-scale Sarkhanese-owned industry, 
improved local agricultural production, and helped to dispel the cornerstone of the 
Communist dialectic that relied on Westerners being viewed as more interested in 
exploiting Sarkhanese labor than in addressing the needs of the Sarkhanese people.75  
Well before contemporary academics had fashioned the robust canon of 
organizational behavior and management theory that exists today, Homer’s achievements 
exemplified how a careful approach to collaboration can yield tremendous results when 
working with foreign populations. Straus contends that two of the most important steps in 
the process of collaboration are obtaining the participation of all of the relevant 
stakeholders and building consensus among these stakeholders during each phase of an 
operation.76 Homer’s decision to go to the elders first, interact with Jeepo as a peer and 
not from a position of authority, and his willingness to live among the people of Chang 
‘dong all contributed to the Atkins’ ability to identify and get to know everyone in the 
village who had a stake in the operation. From his first meeting with the village headman 
to Homer’s recruitment of Jeepo and the numerous contractual agreements established 
with the village elders and the workforce of the Jeepo-Atkins Company, Homer carefully 
ensured that the needs of all of the stakeholders that became involved were met—he built 
consensus phase-by-phase. Additionally, Emma’s involvement in the collaborative 
process (see Figure 15) prior to their journey to Chang ‘dong further illustrates how 
                                                 
75 Homer’s model not only reveals an effective approach to assisting a host nation population but also 
illustrates how a well-rounded, carefully executed program can confront and even reverse anti-
Americanism among indigenous peoples. In their discussion of how to win a foreign publics’ support 
during counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, Campbell and Weitz caution:  .”..pursuing an 
effective strategy to neutralize anti-American sentiment is not easy. Strategic influence campaigns regularly 
encounter problems with cultural and linguistic misunderstandings, ingrained distrust and prejudices, and 
competing sources of information and perceptions. Much anti-U.S. feeling results from a deeply rooted 
alienation from American culture and values.” Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, Non-Military Strategies 
for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgencies (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Project on National Security, 2005), 22. 
76 For additional detail regarding stakeholder involvement and consensus building see chapters two 
and three in Straus, How to Make Collaboration Work.  
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Homer’s dedication to collaboration—with the indigenous population as well as with his 
wife—proved critical to his eventual success.77 
 
Figure 15.  Straus’ Pathways to Action Model78 
While the resulting network centered on tangible production (i.e., pumps), 
Homer’s dense, mesh-like network (of which he is a part) ultimately manifests a 
substantial ability to influence a large number of individuals throughout a broad 
geographic region. The sustained involvement of an American civilian working with 
Sarkhanese citizens in an equal capacity in a for profit business also produced strong 
social capital with numerous local nationals that undoubtedly had the potential to counter 
Communist entrepreneurship at both the individual and collective level.79  This type of 
network is ideal for building lasting and deep-rooted informal ties (e.g., trust, friendship, 
 
                                                 
77 The “pathways to action model” provides the foundation for Straus’ third key element of 
collaboration:  designing a process map. Importantly, he suggests that this approach can be used “to design 
in advance a collaborative process—a pathway to reaching consensus—without knowing what the 
consensus will look like.” Emma’s suggestion for Homer to approach the village elders first proved to be a 
critical factor in how Homer would try to obtain the indigenous population’s cooperation in the execution 
of his plan—even though he could not envision exactly what the desired cooperation would ultimately 
produce. Straus, How to Make Collaboration Work, 81–84. 
78 Ibid., 83. 
79 For additional detail related to social capital, see Anklam, Net Work, 13–15, 101–102, 151–153. 
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and advice) and has the potential for several collateral applications such as gaining 
accurate information concerning local grievances and obtaining actionable intelligence on 
adversarial activity.80 
2. Relevance 
In this modern era of globalization, amidst massive U.S. foreign aid programs and 
population-focused counterinsurgency initiatives, the wild, untouched interior of New 
Guinea may seem an odd place to find anecdotal insight germane to the issue of 
sustainability. However, when attempting to discern what types of programs indigenous 
network developers might best pursue at the local or regional level, the observations of 
several Westerners visiting the primitive tribes of New Guinea may prove enlightening.81  
On multiple occasions the tribesmen were noted as being enthralled not by the plethora of 
modern tools and equipment that tourists and anthropologists brought with them on their 
exhibitions but by the awe-inspiring possibilities harnessed in the small, intense flame of 
the common candle. Even after exposure (albeit quite limited exposure) to modern 
inventions including the airplane and the battery-powered flashlight the natives were 
fascinated by the candle.   
One theory for this peculiar behavior holds that the tribesmen could more easily 
grasp the concept of the candle than, for instance, the notion that light was being emitted 
from a small piece of hardened plastic that had no flame and did not even get hot.82  The 
controlled flame of the candle contrasted markedly with the erratic flames generated by 
cords of burning grass or raging cook-fires but it was still close enough to what the 
tribesmen knew and understood that it demanded contemplation and became highly 
desired. In this regard, indigenous network designers should carefully assess the 
introduction of measures that differ considerably from established local practices to 
ensure that “progress” is made incrementally and within the bounds of a target 
                                                 
80 Adversarial entrepreneurship and collateral applications are discussed in further detail in Chapter 
IX. 
81 Lawrence Osborne, “Letter From New Guinea:  Stranger in the Forest,” New Yorker 81, no. 9 (Apr 
18, 2005): 124–142. Tim F. Flannery, Throwim Way Leg (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1998), 134–
135. 
82 Anna Simons, “First Contact,” lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 9 January 2012. 
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population’s ability to appreciate and absorb the proposed changes. Failing to identify a 
“candle”—whether in terms of imposing new forms of governance or introducing new 
economic or agricultural practices—may doom an initiative to failure from the start. If a 
change agent is unable to comprehend when a population may not need or even want 
what is being offered, or cannot grasp when a population has no viable frame of reference 
from which to consider the benefits of a particular enterprise, the likelihood of that 
change agent succeeding will be markedly reduced. 
  Homer Atkins seemed to intuitively grasp that the solution to improving 
irrigation in Sarkhan, as well as countless other problems facing the people of Vietnam, 
should be approached from the local’s perspective, using the status quo as a point of 
departure and an anchor to which new initiatives should remain somewhat tethered. As 
Homer informed Emma after she suggested that he simply import hand pumps from the 
United States to power his apparatus:  “[The power source] has got to be something they 
use out here . . . something right here, something the natives understand.”83   
3. Local Sustainability and the Dependency Paradox   
Having considered the important step of identifying what programs might 
reasonably be presumed to have a chance of success within a specific target population 
(i.e., the “candles”), indigenous network designers assisting foreign populations should 
also ensure that their initiatives remain viable and sustainable after their departure. 
Homer’s approach to improving Sarkhanese irrigation methods provides a noteworthy 
example of how an external change agent can seek to avoid creating an undesirable 
dependence on their continued presence from the very outset of network development. 
For most aid workers, Foreign Service professionals, or military advisors, fulfilling a 
need or addressing a local grievance is an important initial step towards being able to 
exert positive influence on a specific organization or population. Indeed, entire networks 
may be built with the purpose of helping a community in distress or importing new and 
more efficient ways of conducting simple tasks (e.g., irrigating farmland). However, the 
fulfillment of this need, if not properly planned and executed in a manner that promotes 
                                                 
83 Lederer and Burdick, The Ugly American, 216. 
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local sustainability, can lead to a less than ideal situation that requires external assistance 
to be maintained in order to continue to alleviate whatever condition caused the need in 
the first place.   
This dependency paradox (also referred to as a dependency trap, aid dependency, 
or a “resource curse”) can complicate long-term attempts to influence host nation 
networks and popular support.84  To establish the basic conditions necessary for influence 
to be feasible, external military, interagency, or even civilian change agents typically 
need to be able to offer goods and services relevant and necessary for a particular target 
population. Utilizing external resources or applying levels of expertise that are not readily 
available in the host nation country may prove tempting and expedient as an effective 
means of providing assistance, but these steps have the potential to only exacerbate 
conditions when the initiative cannot be maintained following the departure of the change 
agent or the withdrawal of external resources. Additionally, external change agents must 
carefully assess the likelihood that their efforts may impinge on the population’s 
perception of the host nation government’s ability to provide for their citizens. Homer 
Atkins worked side-by-side with his proxy, Jeepo, ensuring that the Sarkhanese 
community developed the skills and locally sustainable infrastructure necessary to 
continue and even to expand their industrial capacity once Homer left Sarkhan.85  
  
                                                 
84 For a macro-level review of issues relevant to aid dependency, see Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson, 
and Nicolas van de Walle, “An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State 
Building in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Center for Global Development Working Paper 74 (January 2006), 
accessed October 30, 2012, http://www.eboyuju.givewell.org/files/DWDA 2009/Interventions/Moss, 
Pettersson, and van de Walle. 2006. An aid-institutions paradox.pdf.   
85 Near the end of The Ugly American, readers are informed that an engineer in Chang ‘dong 
(presumably Jeepo) has designed and is manufacturing an inexpensive processor for canning fish (one of 
the ideas that Homer advocates while in Vietnam as a simple solution to improving the way of life of the 
Vietnamese population). 
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VII. THE FACILITATOR 
The sage manages affairs without action and spreads doctrines without 
words. . . . He acts but does not rely on his own ability. He accomplishes 
his task but does not claim credit for it. It is precisely because he does not 
claim credit that his accomplishment remains with him.   
–Tao-te Ching86 
A. NETWORK BACKGROUND87 
Prior to being drawn to Sarkhan and recognized by Ambassador MacWhite as a 
potential asset, Father John X. Finian exhibited yet another distinctive approach to 
network development in the rural regions of northern Burma. Finian, a Jesuit missionary 
who had devoted his life to combating the spread of Communism, began his effort in a 
manner reminiscent of the famed military advisor, T. E. Lawrence. Upon arriving in 
Arabia to aid Arab partisans fighting against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, 
Lawrence carefully measured the potential Arab leaders to whom he could offer 
assistance, finally backing Faisal bin Hussein (who would later become the King of Iraq) 
after four other men had failed to meet his standards.88  In The Ugly American, Father 
Finian embarks on a concerted effort to first locate and then vet a local Burmese Catholic 
who could serve as Finian’s proxy—the critical node around which an anti-Communist 
network would emerge. He eventually finds U Tien, a devout Catholic from northern 
                                                 
86 Wing-Tsit Chan trans., The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching) (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1963), 
101. 
87 Father Finian’s network was extracted from chapters 3, 4, and 21 in The Ugly American.   
88 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 4. Aside 
from Lawrence’s own account of his choosing Faisal as it appears in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, some 
scholars have suggested that the decision to back Faisal involved a more comprehensive assessment and 
was the most practical choice based on intelligence reports compiled by the British staff in Cairo and 
correspondence from Faisal’s father, Hussein bin Ali (the Sharif of Mecca), to the British that stated that 
Faisal could raise an Arab revolt in Syria. However, Lawrence’s continued backing of Faisal throughout the 
endeavor, his successful efforts to channel British support to Faisal’s fledgling army, and, finally, Faisal’s 
ultimate success, all suggest that Lawrence made the correct decision when he chose to personally and 
professionally endorse Faisal as the best choice for leading Arab partisans in support of broader British 
goals in Arabia. For additional detail on Lawrence’s selection of Faisal, see Mack, A Prince of Our 
Disorder, 148–149, 202–204; Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Kingmakers: The Invention of the 
Modern Middle East (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008), 206–207; and James Barr, Setting the Desert 
on Fire: T. E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in Arabia, 1916–1918 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
2008), 32, 71, 104–106.  
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Burma working as a driver on the Archbishop of Mokthu’s staff. After a series of tests 
designed to determine U Tien’s trustworthiness, Father Finian finally reveals that he 
wishes for U Tien to aid him in disrupting Communist operations and influence in 
northern Burma. 
In a matter of days, U Tien finds seven other Burmese who he believes might be 
willing to join the enterprise. The men are all invited to a clandestine meeting where 
Father Finian sparingly facilitates a lengthy discussion among the gathered men. 
Throughout the meeting, Finian avoids giving advice or direction to the assembled group. 
Instead, he purposefully chooses to merely help solicit thoughts and opinions from the 
locals concerning what, if any, problems they believed were confronting the common 
Burmese citizen. Eventually the Burmese surmise that their primary collective concern is 
the impingement of individual freedom perpetrated by local Communist party members 
who denied their countrymen the ability to worship and live according to their own 
individual desires. From this inauspicious, “self-organized” beginning, Finian’s 
clandestine network eventually became highly effective at producing and disseminating 
anti-Communist messages through radio broadcasts and newspapers. In time, the network 
would even infiltrate the local Communist apparatus and play a major role in 
destabilizing the entire Communist infrastructure in northern Burma.   
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B. NETWORK OVERVIEW 
 
Figure 16.  Finian’s “Nine Friends” Network 
Figure 16 provides a NetDraw generated visualization of the trust and 
organizational relationships that existed in Father Finian’s extended network. The dense, 
mesh-like group at left consists of the eight Burmese men who comprise the network’s 
core membership. While Father Finian interacts with all of these core members, his 
vetting of U Tien and reliance on U Tien to choose the remaining members of the group 
and serve as their de facto leader suggests that the relationships that Finian develops with 
the other Burmese men are purposefully limited and reveal a distinct approach centered 
on relying on a trusted proxy to oversee critical network functions.89  The implications of 
this method and how they tie to matters of trust and risk acceptance will be discussed 
below. Also depicted are individuals on the periphery of the core—the Archbishop of 
Mokthu, a senior Catholic official in Burma; Ruth Jyoti, a journalist who spends a month 
                                                 
89 The relationships that developed between Father Finian and the other seven core members 
(excluding U Tien) were not based on trust, advice, friendship, organizational, operational, or business ties 
as defined in Chapter III.  Finian purposefully avoided establishing those relationships with the other core 
members.  he only vetted (and truly trusted) U Tien; he actually refused to give direct advice when solicited 
by the other Burmese; only when he is leaving does he think that one of the Burmese finally considers him 
a friend; and the actual operations conducted by the network were planned and executed by the Burmese. 
Father Finian
Archbishop of Mokthu
U Tien ("Friend" 1)
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in northern Burma documenting Father Finian’s exploits; and two Russians, Ambassador 
Louis Krupitzyn and Vladimir Vinich, who share organizational ties with Toki, the 
network member who successfully infiltrates the local Communist apparatus in northern 
Burma.    
C. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 17.  Father Finian’s Network Design 
1. Level of Openness   
The security concerns that confronted Finian’s network as it operated in an 
unconventional warfare capacity necessarily demanded careful consideration of 
prospective members and limited the level of interaction with anyone outside of the 
group.90 Importantly, Finian himself played a pivotal role only in deciding to establish 
his proxy, U Tien, as the central hub of the network. U Tien then selected the remaining 
members of the core group. This decision required Finian to accept a substantial amount 
of both operational and personal risk; the plausible betrayal of Finian by one of U Tien’s 
associates could easily have resulted in Finian being physically harmed (personal risk) or 
in the entire network being compromised and unable to meet its broader goals 
(operational risk). 
                                                 
90 Unconventional warfare is defined by current U.S. joint military doctrine as “activities conducted to 
enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying 
power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. See 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (March 2012), 343. 
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However, by carefully choosing his proxy and then letting U Tien lead the next 
phase of recruitment, the resulting core network possessed a unique capacity to define its 
own purpose without the appearance of it being completely manufactured by a foreign 
external agent (i.e., Finian). This method also set the stage for the emergence of an 
internally-generated, localized approach to meeting the network’s goals and a level of 
motivation that would have been extremely difficult to achieve had Finian sought to take 
a more active role in the group’s genesis.    
2. Level of Formality    
The clandestine, self-organizing nature of the network also affected the group’s 
level of formalization. Finian purposefully did not define the style or procedures that the 
network adopted, choosing instead to let the network members work through their 
problems and potential solutions in their own manner and at their own pace. Anklam 
describes the prospect of “letting go” as “the most difficult task for network leadership” 
and contends that “it is...desirable to shift decision making as close as possible to the 
source of the problem or opportunity.”91  Finian was determined to refrain from imposing 
any set formality on his network— the extent to which formalization did emerge (which 
was limited due to the clandestine nature of the effort and the largely rural environment 
where the network operated) was dependent on the input and desire of the network as a 
whole, not on Father Finian.   
3. Level of Planning   
In analyzing Finian’s approach to network design, it is apparent that his method 
contained a mix of both intent and discovery as he assisted the emergence of a common 
purpose among the core members of his network. Finian’s true intentions were to 
organize a group of Burmese to fight the spread of Communism; however, he deliberately 
risked failure by allowing the eight Burmese to decide for themselves—to discover on 
their own—that Communism was antithetical to their desire for a free Burma and 
warranted them risking their lives to help the Burmese society.   The Burmese could 
                                                 
91 Anklam, Net Work, 111–113. 
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easily have questioned Finian’s intentions and doubted his sincere concern for their 
desires had he started by promulgating a concrete purpose for the group and prescribing 
exactly how the network should function.   
 
Table 6.   Finian’s Network Summary 
D. IMPLICATIONS 
1. Trust and Risk   
Finian’s network is the only one presented in this study that fits into an 
unconventional warfare style scenario. Due to an overwhelming Communist presence and 
considerable Communist influence over the Burmese population, the network is forced to 
remain clandestine and, as a consequence, faces more immediate challenges not present 
during the other networks’ emergence. Personal and operational security are of 
necessarily paramount concern in such an environment, and trust relations, while crucial 
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to many successful network forms, take on an entirely new dimension when a breach of 
faith could easily result in torture or execution.92  
The concept of trust has been defined as “a bet about the future contingent actions 
of others.”93  Perhaps no greater calculation exists in an unconventional warfare 
operation (specifically at the beginning) than the decision to “bet” that an indigenous 
individual or group will perform in the manner desired by the external agent. Indigenous 
personnel may make mistakes or fail to meet the desired standards imposed by foreign 
advisors, but breaches of trust can easily produce irrecoverable consequences, lead to 
bloodshed, or force a particular endeavor to be abandoned completely. This is precisely 
why Finian’s insistence on carefully vetting U Tien and waiting until he believed he had 
found a trustworthy proxy before moving forward demonstrates a credible approach to 
host nation network development.  
At the outset of Finian’s endeavor into the Burmese countryside, he decided to 
limit his search for a suitable proxy to Burmese Catholics. This reliance on what is 
referred to as “category” or “group-based trust” among trust researchers allowed Finian 
to narrow the prospective candidates that he had to choose from.94  Finian believed that 
among all of the ethnic, religious, and ideological groups residing in northern Burma, the 
Catholic population offered a greater chance of providing someone who could identify 
with the priest and who might be willing to join him on his mission. His development of 
“person-based trust” in the Catholic that he eventually identified for recruitment, U Tien, 
demanded a prolonged effort to ensure that the risk that Finian was taking would be 
mitigated to the greatest extent possible. This process included numerous small tests of 
U Tien’s character and a final test that resulted in U Tien being beaten by Communist 
agents who came to his home searching for a nonexistent pistol that Finian had told locals 
he had given to U Tien for protection. 
                                                 
92 For additional insight into the history and importance of “trust networks”—defined as “ramified 
interpersonal connections within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and 
enterprises at risk to the malfeasance of others”—see Charles Tilly, “Trust and Rule,” Theory and Society 
33 (2004): 1–30. 
93 Sztompka, Trust, 25. 
94 For a summary of “category-based” and “person-based” trust, see Adams and Webb, “Trust in 
Small Military Teams,” 3–8. 
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At various times throughout the development of the relationship between Finian 
and U Tien, Sztompka’s qualities of primary trust (i.e., reputation, performance, and 
appearance) and secondary or derived trustworthiness (i.e., accountability, pre-
commitment, and trust-inducing situations) played a crucial role in Finian’s ultimate 
decision to trust U Tien and move forward in the development of his network with U 
Tien as its indigenous hub.95   These six factors of trust estimation all influenced Finian’s 
decision to choose U Tien, not just as the right Catholic, but as the right man for the 
job—a trustworthy anti-Communist willing to risk his life supporting Finian’s cause.   
2. Facilitation   
From a network design perspective, Finian’s decision to facilitate, rather than 
direct, the crucial first meeting of the eight Burmese allowed the network’s members to 
participate in establishing value and purpose for their effort. Finian was solicited for 
advice repeatedly and several Burmese expected him to either tell them what he wanted 
them to do or at the very least demand that they should attempt to expand Catholicism in 
the region. Finian did neither; instead he merely listened and helped clarify and amplify 
the group’s ideas. Through prolonged internal discussion, the group collectively 
determined that their chief concern was securing individual freedom for the people of 
Burma and that the Communists stood directly in the way of them realizing that goal. The 
text further amplifies Finian’s unique approach to facilitating network emergence:  “This 
was, [Finian] was sure, the first time that these men had ever been told that a big and 
important decision was entirely their own ...and would be followed by the white man.”96 
The day following the crucial first meeting, the group met again and discussed the 
considerable amount of knowledge that each man already possessed concerning 
Communist activity in the region. Having determined a broad purpose for their network 
and with all of the relevant intelligence each of the network members possessed shared 
throughout the collective group, the men then spent the next two weeks (with Father 
                                                 
95 Sztompka, Trust, 69–97. 
96 Lederer and Burdick, The Ugly American, 54. 
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Finian assisting along the way) determining what course of action they should take to 
confront the Communist threat.  
Straus contends that in addition to ideally representing a neutral third party, a 
facilitator must also be a process guide, a tool giver, and a process educator. While Father 
Finian may not have been truly “neutral” (he was, after all, a dedicated anti-Communist), 
his efforts otherwise follow Straus’ definition of the four functions of a “process 
facilitator.”97  As the network grew and began conducting operations, Finian continued 
guiding and educating the network’s members on establishing and maintaining effective 
processes and developing appropriate tools to be successful as their activities expanded. 
By the time Finian left Burma to confront the Communist threat in Sarkhan, his network 
was self-sufficient and no longer required the priest’s assistance as it shifted its attention 
to other provinces throughout Burma. 
  
                                                 
97 Straus, How to Make Collaboration Work, 117–128. 
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VIII. THE PERSUADER 
When I was asked to read palms at the Philippine Ambassador’s dinner, it 
was a God-given opportunity. All of the Sarkhanese brass except the King 
were present. And then that knucklehead of an assistant of yours started 
laughing at me and trying to make a fool out of me. If he had an ounce of 
brains, he would have noticed how serious the Sarkhanese were. And if 
those fools at the State Department had briefed him properly, he would 
have known all about palmistry and astrology before he even came here. 
                                            – COL Hillandale to Ambassador MacWhite98 
A. NETWORK BACKGROUND99 
Colonel Edwin B. Hillandale has extensive experience in Southeast Asian affairs 
by the time he joins Ambassador MacWhite’s staff in Sarkhan as a military attaché on 
loan from the Philippines. The character of Colonel Hillandale closely resembles the real-
life OSS veteran and Air Force officer, Edward G. Lansdale, whose exploits in the 
Philippines and Vietnam are often regarded as one example of how to successfully 
interact with and advise host nation governments in Asia.100  Like Lansdale, the fictional 
Colonel Hillandale shares a close personal relationship with Ramon Magsaysay, the 
Filipino Secretary of National Defense from 1950 to 1953 and President of the 
Philippines from 1953 until his death in an airplane crash in 1957. The network presented 
in this chapter is derived from Hillandale’s work for Magsaysay in the run up to the 1953 
Presidential election.   
Although Hillandale uses similar techniques to persuade members of the 
Sarkhanese government later in the book, his efforts in the Filipino countryside to sway 
                                                 
98 Lederer and Burdick, The Ugly American, 182. 
99 Colonel Hillandale’s network was extracted from chapters 9, 10, 15, and 21 in The Ugly American.   
100 Both Lederer and Burdick knew Lansdale personally. It is widely believed and often 
acknowledged that he was the basis for the fictional Hillandale. Lansdale’s activity in Asia from the end of 
World War II to his last assignment in Vietnam in 1968 has been the subject of several books—not all of 
which paint him in the favorable light that Lansdale himself sets forth in his autobiography, In the Midst of 
Wars. For a more comprehensive view of Lansdale’s role as a military advisor and CIA operative in Asia, 
see Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998) and 
Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War (Culture, Politics, and the Cold War) (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 2005). 
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Communist-influenced villagers towards Magsaysay provide ample evidence of yet 
another distinct approach to developing indigenous networks presented in The Ugly 
American. Over the course of several weeks, Hillandale journeys alone to the province of 
Cuenco where Communist propagandists had successfully convinced the majority of the 
population that Magsaysay and his imperialist American backers could not relate to the 
problems of the common Filipino and did not deserve their support. Colonel Hillandale 
initially uses his knowledge of the local language and his appreciation for local music and 
food to establish relationships with several local men (the “Cuenco 10” from the network 
sociogram, see Figure 18). After earning the villagers’ trust by providing them an 
American with whom they could identify, Hillandale continues to journey to the area 
week after week to socialize with the locals and counter the Communist anti-American 
rhetoric.101  Lansdale eventually convinces the villagers that they have no reason to 
distrust Magsaysay simply because he associates with Americans and the province ends 
up heavily favoring Magsaysay in the ensuing Presidential election. 
1. The Network That Could Have Been 
Following Hillandale’s arrival in Sarkhan to help Ambassador MacWhite 
confront the growing Communist threat in that country, Hillandale devotes considerable 
effort towards developing an appreciation for Sarkhanese culture and identifying what in 
particular is important to the average Sarkhanese citizen. In addition to his learning to 
play popular local songs on his harmonica and immersing himself for days in the study of 
Sarkhanese history and the dossiers of Sarkhanese leaders, Hillandale observed that 
astrology and palmistry were held in remarkably high esteem among the native 
                                                 
101 In Lansdale’s autobiography, he describes two instances where he uses his personal example to 
persuade Filipino villagers that the Communist propaganda concerning Americans was nothing more than a 
self-serving myth intended to manipulate the indigenous population. Near the beginning of the Communist 
insurgency in the Philippines, Lansdale happened upon a Communist political officer decrying “American 
imperialism” in a town square in Pampanga province. Lansdale interrupted the political officer by asking 
“What’s the matter?  Didn’t you ever have an American friend?”  The assembled villagers flocked to 
Lansdale and assured him that they did not share the Communist agent’s views of Americans. A second 
event somewhat more removed from the positive American influence associated with U.S. assistance to the 
Philippines during World War II occurred in 1951:  Lansdale recalls Communist Huk guerrillas attempting 
to hunt him down after he had spent time on the island of Panay happily socializing with villagers and 
playing popular Filipino music with them on his harmonica. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 10, 83. 
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population.102  Hillandale, who had previously studied the occult sciences while stationed 
in China, uses his palm reading skills at a diplomatic reception to impress the Prime 
Minister of Sarkhan and to successfully influence him to order two Sarkhanese generals 
who were competing for power to depart the country before they made problems for the 
government (they were both given ambassadorships). The Prime Minister was so 
impressed with Hillandale that he insisted that the colonel read the King of Sarkhan’s 
palm at the King’s private residence. This was exactly what Hillandale had hoped would 
happen. He carefully prepared a series of astrological readings that he believed could 
persuade the King to initiate military maneuvers in northern Sarkhan near where 
Communist Chinese troops had been massing on the Chinese side of the border. 
Hillandale presumed that the international community would view such an action as a 
display of solidarity with the West in an attempt by the Sarkhanese to ostensibly deter 
Chinese Communist aggression against the free nation of Sarkhan. Unfortunately, 
Hillandale’s plan is undermined by George Swift, the Deputy Chief of Mission, who 
offends the Sarkhanese leadership by not following the strict protocol surrounding a visit 
to the Sarkhanese Royal Palace. Because of Swift’s breach of etiquette, Hillandale is 
never given the opportunity to meet with the King. 
                                                 
102 While in Vietnam in early 1955, Lansdale, who had previously noted the population’s reverence 
for astrology, convinced the South Vietnamese government to institute a psychological warfare initiative 
consisting of an astrological almanac supposedly written by several respected occult scholars that predicted 
a “dark future” for the Communists in 1955. In fact, Lansdale’s American staff assisted the South 
Vietnamese in manufacturing the entire account. The almanac became a best seller in North Vietnam and 
sold out of several printings. See Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 226–227 and Nashel, Lansdale’s Cold 
War, 177. 
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B. NETWORK OVERVIEW 
 
Figure 18.  Hillandale’s “Cuenco 10” Network 
Figure 18 depicts the portion of Colonel Hillandale’s ego-network that he 
developed during his frequent visits to the province of Cuenco preceding the Filipino 
Presidential election in 1953.103 Magsaysay, who loans Colonel Hillandale to 
Ambassador MacWhite to assist him in Sarkhan, and Ambassador MacWhite are also 
included in the sociogram for context. The hub-and-spoke network structure that emerged 
from the NetDraw analysis consists of the friendship ties established between Hillandale 
and the ten Cuenco villagers that he continued to meet with over the course of several 
                                                 
103 Ego-networks consist of the ties between a specific individual (i.e., the ego) and those actors (also 
known as alters) that he or she is directly connected to. Ego-networks are a subset of “complete networks” 
that attempt to capture all relevant actors and relational ties within a particular network at a given time. See 
Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 81–82. Hillandale’s complete ego-network would include members of 
the U.S. Embassy staff in Sarkhan, several Asian diplomats, and other lesser characters that are shown to 
have ties to Hillandale throughout The Ugly American. The network presented here consists only of 
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weeks and the advice, friendship, and organizational (i.e., U.S. Embassy) ties between 
Hillandale, Magsaysay, and Ambassador MacWhite.104   
 
C. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 19.  Colonel Hillandale’s Network Design 
1. Level of Openness   
In many regards, Colonel Hillandale’s network was open to anyone who was 
drawn to his harmonica. His public display of affection for local foods, music, and 
customs earned him attention from villagers and dignitaries alike and, although his 
behavior was somewhat contrived, his true appreciation for the peoples he found himself 
among was at the core of his ability to influence them. Hillandale learned a tremendous 
amount about the lands that he visited by submersing himself among the indigenous 
population—even at the risk of exposing himself to violence at the hands of Communist 
agents or criminals who may have capitalized on his frequent choice to travel alone when 
venturing out among the locals.   
The network model, however, is not completely open. The people that Hillandale 
chose to concentrate his attention on tended to offer something in return for the risks that 
                                                 
104 There were, quite possibly, many more Filipinos that were drawn to Hillandale during his visits to 
Cuenco and still more that were conceivably influenced by word of mouth emanating from those who 
actually socialized with him. However, the text directly refers to “about ten Filipinos” that originally asked 
Hillandale to lunch on his first visit to Cuenco and subsequently asked him to return to spend more time 
with them. Lederer and Burdick, The Ugly American, 113.   
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he was taking by attempting to personally influence them. The villagers in Cuenco 
province, for instance, had votes to give to Magsaysay; and the Sarkhanese government 
had the ability to display closer relations to the West if they had followed the advice that 
Hillandale was attempting to provide them (albeit through the mechanism of 
manufactured astrological advice). Hillandale carefully selected the targets of his 
persuasion and then used a decidedly atypical approach to make it appear that he was 
someone that the locals should want to get to know and who truly had their best 
intentions in mind.   
2. Level of Formality 
Hillandale’s network design did not include formal standards dictating how the 
network’s members should interact or what roles network members were intended to 
assume.   However, his knowledge of local customs and courtesies allowed him to act in 
a manner that was deferential to whatever indigenous population he was working with. 
This was not common among the Americans that the local populations often encountered. 
The localized formalities that Hillandale’s personal actions adhered to ensured that he did 
not offend anyone and that his presence was accepted. Although his activities appeared to 
be informal and based on his true desire to get to know the local people and their way of 
life, in reality he worked diligently to develop an acute awareness of how best to 
influence the host nation population within the bounds of what was considered culturally 
acceptable. 
3. Level of Planning 
Part of Hillandale’s unique approach to designing indigenous networks that could 
serve his purposes involved an indirect method of manipulation. Like Father Finian, 
Hillandale did not simply tell the Filipinos or Sarkhanese what he had planned for them 
to do—he wanted them to figure it out on their own and hopefully decide on a course of 
action that met with his expectations. Unlike all of the other network designers presented 
in this study, Hillandale did not seek out a proxy (MacWhite had several) who could 
assist him in his endeavors. He went directly to the source of the problem (i.e., the 
Communist-influenced province of Cuenco and the non-aligned leadership of Sarkhan) 
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and attempted to persuade them to act in a manner that supported his ultimate goals. In 
the Philippines this meant traveling to Cuenco to dispel Communist myths of American 
malevolence. In Sarkhan it entailed carefully and surreptitiously persuading the 
Sarkhanese government to conduct military maneuvers that appeared to signal that they 
were siding with the West in the Cold War. While he could not foresee what his actions 
would produce, Hillandale did carefully plan how he would attempt to build his networks 
and what would be needed to ensure that the network served its desired purpose.     
 
Table 7.   Hillandale’s Network Summary 
D. IMPLICATIONS 
1. Cross-Cultural Understanding 
The quest for developing an appreciation for different cultures and an 
understanding for how societal differences impact one’s ability to build networks and 
work with indigenous populations is at the heart of most writing and discussion 
concerning working with foreign populations. Institutions ranging from the Peace Corps 
• Convince local population that Magsaysay and his American backers could relate to the problems faced by the common Filipino 
Purpose 
• Hub-and-Spoke Structure 
• Borrowed space (in local villages) 
• Personal interactions 
Style 
• Intangible relational capital produces tangible results (votes) Value 
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to the U.S. military portray displaying “cultural understanding” as a critical component of 
successful overseas service. This section will focus on three aspects of cross-cultural 
understanding that Colonel Hillandale’s actions can serve to illustrate. His methodology 
included learning as much as he could about the collective consciousness of the 
populations that he worked among; uncovering the inner motivations, strengths, and 
weaknesses of the individuals he worked with directly; and consciously concealing his 
American ideological constructs that could easily have derailed his efforts if the native 
populations had not believed that he was looking out for their interests first and not those 
of the American government.   
a.  National Character 
Even though Colonel Hillandale is ultimately interested in combating the 
spread of Communism throughout Asia, he approaches the process of identifying and 
developing effective programs to counter Communist expansion by first getting to know 
the population and finding out what makes them tick. As he explains to Ambassador 
MacWhite, “Every person and every nation has a key which will open their hearts. If you 
use the right key, you can maneuver any person or any nation any way you want.”105  
Despite the reluctance of some social psychologists and anthropologists to 
agree that there is such a thing as a collective “mind” shared by members of specific 
societies, Raphael Patai suggests that it is possible to discern a society’s “national 
character,” which he defines as “the sum total of the motives, traits, beliefs, and values 
shared by the plurality in a national population.”106  In his book, The Arab Mind, Patai 
describes the evolution of the Arabic national character and details how its current 
manifestation has been molded and is still being influenced by a variety of Arab practices 
ranging from how they choose to raise their children to the unique qualities of the Arabic 
language and the impact of centuries of Bedouin and Islamic traditions on their way of 
life. Discovering the national characters of the various Asian populations that Colonel 
Hillandale worked with in Asia was a sine qua non of his methodology—that is where he 
                                                 
105 Lederer and Burdick, The Ugly American, 181. 
106 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002), 17–19. 
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started from and the most important aspect of his technique. Only when he felt that he 
knew the people well enough did he carefully move on to discovering what “keys” were 
needed to persuade specific individuals to do what he wanted them to do.   
b.  Mind-Models 
Hillandale proved exceedingly adept at recognizing what Flick refers to as 
the “mind-models” of the host nation counterparts and local nationals that he seeks to 
influence. Flick describes the process of developing a true appreciation for another 
individual’s point of view as discovering that person’s “internal logic”—the thread that 
binds the multiple “mind-models” that a person has developed over the course of their 
lifetime that affect how they view and interact with the world around them.107  Mind-
models are the “mental mechanisms . . . we use to attribute meaning to our experiences 
and make sense of them.”108 In a manner similar to how Patai describes the evolution of a 
collective “mind,” Flick observes that multiple factors affect the formation of an 
individual’s mind-models. From basic demographic differences regarding race and 
gender to an individual’s own prior experiences, their profession, and the unique impact 
of cultural values and religion, Flick notes that every individual accumulates a variety of 
specific thought processes throughout their lifetime that impact what they feel and how 
they act.109  The conglomeration of these various mind-models can result in significant 
dissimilarities among individuals who come from different backgrounds—differences 
that can be even more pronounced when dealing with people from other parts of the 
world. Just as Edward Lansdale encountered and attempted to overcome extreme 
variations in the personalities of Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines and Ngo Dinh 
Diem in Vietnam, Colonel Hillandale seeks to discover the individual “keys,” the mind-
models, of the Filipinos and Sarkhanese that he attempts to persuade in The Ugly 
American.   
                                                 
107 Flick, From Debate to Dialogue, 69. 
108 Ibid., 59. 
109 Ibid., 60. 
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Flick contends that it is not enough to simply listen to someone else’s 
point of view or acknowledge that another society might have a different way of doing 
things. To truly “understand” someone else, one must be able to grasp:  1) what they do 
and do not consider important and valuable; 2) how they interpret events and 
experiences; 3) how assumptions influence their thinking; and 4) what effect 
circumstance has on their perception of events.110  As one scholar responsible for 
preparing U.S. personnel for deployment to the Middle East has noted:  “Simply 
observing a culture through the prism of our own beliefs and cultural worldview leads to 
many misconceptions. More often than not, this results in a form of cultural shock that 
can be totally debilitating . . .”111  Taking the leap from simply being “open-minded” or 
knowledgeable of a foreign culture to truly appreciating national character and what it 
takes to uncover someone else’s individual mind-models goes far towards developing 
comprehensive cross-cultural understanding. The final step, however, involves the 
equally important task of realizing how one’s own mind-models can inadvertently and 
unconsciously impact successful host nation interaction before it even really begins. 
c.  Cognitive Bias 
Colonel Hillandale demonstrates how change agents can mitigate the 
negative effects of one’s own natural and unavoidable cognitive biases by addressing 
problems and people from the locals’ perspective, not from an American one. For the 
broader purposes of this work, the term cognitive bias (i.e., seeing what one expects to 
see) relates to the inability of most Americans working abroad to remain objective and 
separate themselves from the problem-solving and decision-making methods developed 
throughout their American upbringing. Change agents must be able to acknowledge their 
bias towards their own way of thinking, their own cultural norms and values, and their 
individual perceptions of reality and yet still be able to ascertain how members of an 
indigenous population view the world around them and approach the task of problem-
solving. To be truly adept at cross-cultural understanding, change agents must know 
                                                 
110 Ibid., 68–69. 
111 Norvell B. De Atkine, foreword to The Arab Mind, by Raphael Patai (New York: Hatherleigh 
Press, 2002), xi. 
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themselves—their own strengths, weaknesses, and motivations—as well as they know the 
people they are trying to work with.   
One specific manifestation of cognitive bias, that of naïve realism, is 
strikingly indicative of the behavior displayed by Ambassador Sears and several other 
characters in The Ugly American whose ethnocentrism borders on outright racism. Ross 
and Ward contend that a naïve realist thinks that his or her own perception of reality is 
objective, comprehensive, and rational and assumes that other rational human beings who 
have access to identical information will think and react to experiences and stimuli the 
same way that they do.112 A third tenet of naïve realism (and the most illustrative for the 
purposes intended here) suggests that if other human beings do not share a naïve realist’s 
viewpoint when exposed to the same information it must be because of one of three 
possible reasons:  1) they are incapable of reaching reasonable conclusions from 
objective evidence (e.g., they are irrational or lazy); 2) their views are distorted due to an 
underlying bias; or 3) they must have been exposed to a different set of facts and 
information.113  Ross and Ward further elaborate:  encumbered blinded saddled 
Given the naïve realist’s conviction that he or she sees things 
“naturally”—sees them as they “really are”—then other actors’ differing 
views and responses must reflect something other than a natural, 
unmediated registering of objective reality. The naïve realist’s initial 
interpretation of differences of opinion is apt to be relatively charitable—
that the other party has not yet been exposed to the “way things really 
are’” that the other party has not yet been privy to the “real” facts and 
considerations.114 
 
                                                 
112 Baritz describes the American propensity to perceive the world “as populated by frustrated or 
potential Americans” as “solipsistic thinking.”  Solipsism is defined as “extreme egocentrism” and the 
belief “that the self is the only existent thing.”  Similarly to naïve realists, Baritz argues that American 
solipsists believe that other cultures would behave more like Americans if they were simply given the 
chance and were freed of “ignorance and poverty.”  Baritz notes that solipsism not only supported the 
general “American optimism” that led the U.S. into the Vietnam War but also served to justify the 
“ignorance” that impeded American efforts throughout the entire conflict. Loren Baritz, Backfire: A History 
of How American Culture Led Us Into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 30–34. 
113 Lee Ross and Andrew Ward, “Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict 
and Misunderstanding,” in Values and Knowledge, ed. Edward S. Reed et al. (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 
1996), 110–111. http://www.mediate.com/GeoffSharp/docs/NaiveRealism.pdf. 
114 Ibid., 116. 
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2. A Note on Edward Lansdale 
By most accounts, Edward G. Lansdale could be considered an expert in cross-
cultural understanding. In the parlance of modern writers, he was also a “champion” or a 
“salesman” who pushed indigenous causes that inevitably (and often not obviously) 
coincided with American objectives.115  He grasped that to be trusted enough to change 
what the locals thought and did—rather than what they professed to believe or said they 
would do—he needed to establish what French and Raven term “referent power”—the 
ability to influence rather than simply control the decisions made by another individual 
based on that individual’s real or unconscious desire to identify with the source of 
influence and gain “satisfaction by conformity.”116  Lansdale also focused on increasing 
what Cialdini calls his “likeability” by conforming to local customs and developing an 
appreciation for the local language, food, and music.117  He got to know the people; he 
carefully assessed the men he wanted to influence; and he refused to let his own personal 
views interfere with his carefully constructed methods of persuasion. This approach 
worked to varying degrees of success throughout his protracted and personal involvement 
in the formation of two modern states (one of which still exists today).   
It is necessary to observe that the reality of Lansdale’s skillfully contrived 
performance in Asia became a source of criticism of The Ugly American in the years 
following its publication. Lansdale, like the fictional Hillandale and Ambassador 
MacWhite, was consumed with his anti-Communist crusade. It did not really matter how 
he and his colleagues spread across the globe achieved their goals so long as the countries 
that comprised the Third World leaned towards the West and were pushed or manipulated 
away from Soviet and Chinese influence. The obsession with “modernization theory” and 
the idea that “developing countries” around the world could be drawn into the Western 
sphere of influence if they were simply exposed, however slowly, to capitalism and 
                                                 
115 Gladwell describes “salesmen” as those individuals “with the ability to persuade us when we are 
unconvinced of what we are hearing” and who are “critical to the tipping of word-of-mouth epidemics.”  
Gladwell, Tipping Point, 70. Brafman and Beckstrom impart similar characteristics on their “champions” 
who they describe as “relentless in promoting a new idea.”  Brafman and Beckstrom, Starfish and the 
Spider, 99.  
116 French and Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” 161–163. 
117 Cialdini, Influence, 167–176. 
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liberal democratic ideals smacks of naïve realism in and of itself.118  However, this study 
is not concerned with a critique of the motives behind the networks that are produced by 
the change agents identified in The Ugly American; it is about the methods those change 
agents employed while designing their networks. Lansdale’s underlying desire to export 
American ideas did not diminish his effectiveness at persuading people to act the way he 
wanted them to act. His skillful manipulation was directed at Americans as well as 
foreigners and his approach (represented by the actions of the fictional Hillandale) would 
have been just as unique and deserving of attention had he not been secretly pushing an 
agenda. His method is what makes the network design model stand out, not the results or 
intended results of his actions.    
Lansdale further elaborates on his true intentions in his autobiography:  “When 
we Americans give of our substance to the people of other countries, we should give as 
generously of our ideology as we do of our money, our guns, our cereal grains, and our 
machinery.”119  The important thing for both Lansdale and Hillandale is that they did not 
publically declare their desire to export American ideals to the nations that they visited. 
They established cross-cultural understanding and worked by, with, and through the 
indigenous peoples to great effect and prodded them in a direction that supported U.S. 
foreign policy. In the unending contest between various dogmas and ideologies that pull 
the nations of the world together and apart, those who are more skilled at how they send 
their messages will inevitably be likely to succeed than those who simply insist that their 
message is right and demand that it be heard. This lesson is as applicable today as it was 
at the height of the Cold War and is ultimately what this study is about. 
  
                                                 
118 For a brief overview of modernization theory—the concept that “American institutions, ideas, and 
technology not only could but should be transplanted into other areas of the world”—and how it relates to a 
critique of Lansdale’s actions and The Ugly American, see Nashel, Lansdale’s Cold War, 182–186. 
119 Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 105. 
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IX. IMPACTING DARK NETWORKS 
While considerable progress has been made to incorporate SNA and network 
theory into the mapping and interdiction of adversarial or “dark” networks, the potential 
for utilizing these methods to strengthen friendly networks and influence non-aligned 
parties remains largely untapped. The Anbar Awakening and subsequent Sons of Iraq 
(SoI) initiative and ongoing Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan provide 
two prominent examples of how tactical leaders and operational planners in today’s 
irregular warfare and counterinsurgency environments are faced with the daunting 
challenge of navigating (and in most cases manipulating) dynamic, culturally-attuned 
relationships to indirectly impact the sources of power and legitimacy that America’s 
enemies rely upon to remain solvent. These initiatives, and many others like them, are 
typically undertaken in areas where allegiance to the host nation government may be 
suspect and where the populations are at risk, both physically and psychologically, from 
insurgent or terrorist groups. These initiatives occur in “grey” areas. 
Most of the junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (as well as their 
civilian counterparts) that are tasked with implementing these types of efforts are only 
briefly exposed to two extremely relevant fields that address what they are attempting to 
accomplish:  complex network theory and social network analysis. Grey network 
developers face a wide variety of unique challenges and circumstances wherever they 
may be tasked or may decide themselves to implement these types of initiatives. While 
Father Finian’s network development occurs in an unconventional warfare environment 
and Ambassador MacWhite’s from a much more comfortable, empowered, and non-
threatened position, this study is not suggesting that any particular model is best for any 
specific situation. Further study may demonstrate or disprove such a possibility, but this 
work means to propose that the main tenets of the network approaches adopted by each 
change agent can be absorbed and then adapted to any given situation when a network 
designer assesses that they might prove effective. Not everyone possesses the strong 
interpersonal skills of a Colonel Hillandale or the engineering skills of a Homer Atkins. 
But it is not beyond reason to assume that a network designer can work to develop 
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Hillandale-like cross-cultural understanding or, like the Ugly American himself, 
specifically tailor a collaborative approach that focuses on local problems and is 
perceived as both legitimate and necessary by the indigenous people. Additionally, 
countless other fictional and non-fictional accounts of men and women who have built 
networks on foreign soil undoubtedly have the potential to produce still more distinctive 
network models and unique network design approaches that can further increase our 
capacity to prepare future network developers for success in the challenging arena of 
irregular warfare. 
While this work focuses primarily on illuminating characteristics of network 
design models useful for indigenous network development, it is beneficial to briefly 
address the potential that grey network development in general possesses to assist in the 
broader effort to combat dark network operations and influence. Further research could 
elaborate significantly on this particular aspect of grey network utility. However, three 
examples are presented here:  directed collateral applications, identifying adversarial 
entrepreneurship (i.e., adversarial utilization of grey networks), and shrinking the “white 
space.”  Each of these uses is introduced following a brief discussion of contemporary 
approaches to network targeting.   
A. STRATEGIC OPTIONS  
Despite a decidedly robust effort by the U.S. military and interagency 
communities to map dark networks using social network analysis, efforts to incorporate 
SNA-related data into the formulation of strategic options for disrupting adversarial 
networks have only recently become more frequent. Military strategists and SNA 
theorists now regularly distinguish between two distinct approaches to dark network 
interdiction when formulating options. Although it can be argued that the terminology 
used by the two fields contain significant semantic differences, the theorists’ distinction 
of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies closely align with what the U.S. military currently 
refers to as the direct and indirect targeting approaches (see Figure 20).120 A decade-old 
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reliance on direct, kinetic targeting of key terrorist leaders and facilitators is now 
supplemented by an indirect approach as well—what Joint Publication 2–36, 
Counterterrorism, describes as “actions taken…to enable partners to conduct operations 
against terrorists and their organizations as well as actions taken to shape and stabilize 
those environments as a means to erode the capabilities of terrorist organizations and 
degrade their ability to acquire support and sanctuary.”121 By comparison, SNA theorists 
Dr. Nancy Roberts and Dr. Sean Everton define their non-kinetic strategies of institution 
building, psychological operations, information operations, and rehabilitation along a 
similar line of thinking, suggesting that this approach “involves a more subtle and patient 
application of power…to undermine terror networks.”122 It is within the realm of non-
kinetic and indirect approaches to countering dark networks that grey networks have the 
potential to prove influential. 
 
Figure 20.  Strategic Campaign Framework123 
                                                 
121 CJCS, Counterterrorism, III-5. 
122 Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 5. 
123 From CJCS, Counterterrorism, III-2. 
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Direct, kinetic interdiction of dark networks has proven effective in meeting the 
immediate goals of identifying and removing critical actors in terrorist and insurgent 
organizations. However, these efforts should be combined with an equal or perhaps 
greater determination to impact the influence of dark networks through proactive grey 
and light network analysis and non-kinetic, indirect operations. The U.S. must be 
cautious in relying on technologically-driven, kinetic-based approaches that have the 
potential to supplant the more indiscriminate kinetic approaches (e.g., carpet bombing, 
burning villages, etc.) that ultimately yielded negative effects in past counterinsurgencies.   
While the current counterterrorism and counterinsurgency techniques that are utilized by 
the United States and its allies are undoubtedly better at limiting the number of civilian 
casualties and collateral damage during kinetic operations, the question of whether or not 
drone strikes and night raids create more support for insurgent and terrorist groups still 
remains unanswered.   
1. Collateral Applications  
U.S. strategists should acknowledge the need for a comprehensive strategic 
communications plan that addresses the potential impact of kinetic operations on non-
aligned individuals and communities—even those not directly targeted or affected by 
those specific operations. Such information campaigns, designed and executed with host 
nation considerations in mind and, when possible, through host nation channels, have the 
potential to not only mitigate the negative effects of kinetic operations but also to 
promote greater overall support from the populations that are at the center of 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.124 Grey networks are ideal for 
assisting these types of information operations by helping to identify grievances (with the 
host nation government, U.S., or insurgent groups), test messages, assist in message 
dissemination, and provide relevant and prompt feedback. This example of a collateral 
application could feasibly be applied to a mature and well-designed grey network (e.g., 
Father Finian or Homer Atkins’ network).   
                                                 
124 See Campbell and Weitz, “Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism,” 25–31. 
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A wide variety of additional secondary uses can potentially be applied to 
established grey networks ranging from providing assistance in reconstruction or disaster 
relief operations to supporting personnel recovery efforts or unconventional warfare 
scenarios. These applications are principally ancillary—they must be based on effective 
relationship building and trust establishment and only enacted if and when the network’s 
U.S. manager views that they are feasible. This approach holds the potential to bypass 
problems associated with working through traditional “blue” or “green” networks (those 
of the U.S. or host national government respectively).125   These inherent shortcomings 
can include but are not limited to the prospect that U.S. or host nation programs or 
personnel might be perceived as illegitimate, detached, or threatening to certain 
populations who may be sympathetic to adversarial organizations or passively tolerant of 
insurgent or terrorist activity.    
2. Identifying Adversarial Entrepreneurship   
While terrorist and insurgent organizations are typified by their close association 
with violent tactics and asymmetric warfare, it should not be assumed that their 
approaches to gaining and maintaining the popular support that they need to survive, 
grow, and eventually succeed are confined to the use of force or coercion. Communist 
agents throughout the Cold War successfully utilized political and social entrepreneurship 
at a localized level to modify the policies that they were espousing in a manner that 
accommodated each targeted population and often addressed their specific unique 
grievances. By not necessarily revealing the overall final goal of the Communist agenda, 
these agents were able to garner support from local nationals (particularly farmers and 
peasants) who rarely fully appreciated the impact that a socialist or communist 
administration would eventually have on their everyday lives. In this regard, a greater 
understanding of the techniques associated with grey network development is beneficial 
to being able to recognize and possibly interdict efforts by terrorist and insurgent groups 
who may use the more subtle methods associated with political and social 
entrepreneurship. By countering adversarial grey network development, whether it is 
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centered on ideological, political, economic, educational, religious, or social principles, 
U.S. and allied counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts stand a greater chance of 
eliminating the critical support and perceptions of legitimacy that adversarial networks 
need to exist.   
3. Shrinking the “White Space”   
Just as enemy formations in conventional military struggles require “freedom of 
maneuver” to be effective on the battlefield, today’s terrorist and insurgent organizations 
must be able to find sanctuary and support in areas and among populations that are not 
controlled or influenced by U.S. or host nation government forces. For dark networks to 
remain viable, they must continue to maintain some semblance of a foothold among the 
“relevant population.”  As T. E. Lawrence once observed:  “Rebellion . . . must have . . . 
a population . . . sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. 
Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent 
passively sympathetic.”126 
   While it is critical for adversarial networks to maintain at least a minimum level 
of popular support, it must be acknowledged that U.S. or host nation counterterrorist or 
counterinsurgency forces do not necessarily require populations to actively support the 
government, they only must deny popular support to the enemy. Populations can and 
have turned against insurgent and terrorist forces while not simultaneously and 
unequivocally deciding to support the ruling powers. These individuals or groups who 
choose to support neither the government nor the enemy (in either a passive or active 
manner) may find nonviolent protest or even political activism as a means to address 
whatever grievances they might have with the government that precludes their outright 
support. To the counterinsurgent, while pro-government support is a goal, it is not a 
necessary requirement to defeat an insurgency. To use Mao’s analogy, simply denying 
the insurgent “fish” access to certain areas of the population’s “water” (regardless of 
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whether or not U.S. or host nation forces are welcomed there) is a step in the right 
direction. Grey network development along the lines that are discussed in this study has 
the potential to accomplish this task. 
B. REVIEW AND ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Grey networks can serve as a means to indirectly bolster support for the 
government through identifying grievances, promoting economic stability, and possibly 
diminishing anti-Americanism through the development of localized solutions to local 
problems (as evidenced through Homer Atkins’ network) or simply by countering 
misperceptions of Americans and broader U.S. policy (as evidenced through Colonel 
Hillandale’s network). They can also serve to simply shrink the amount of “white space” 
available for terrorist and insurgent use. This “neutral” area consists of physical land, 
individuals, and communities that are vulnerable to political entrepreneurship and 
intimidation by enemy networks. By designing and implementing grey networks in these 
regions, it is likely that adversarial groups would find it more difficult to gain support 
there and would be inclined to seek backing elsewhere.   
Although not included as a part of this study, several aspects of social movement 
theory provide a useful framework through which this type of approach to denying 
collective action mechanisms may be applied. Among other key components necessary 
for insurgent and terrorist movements to manifest and survive, social movement theory 
addresses the impact of resource availability and utilization, the importance of 
opportunity, and the manner in which collective action (support or active participation) is 
framed. Grey networks have the capacity to be leveraged, either directly or collaterally, 
against a number of these collective action requirements. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
A. EVOLUTION OF RESEARCH AGENDA 
This study originally began as part of a project intended to familiarize the author 
with the steps involved in encoding data for social network analysis. Any number of 
corporate hierarchies, military organizations, or even terrorist groups with sufficient 
documentation could have been used to extract the formal and informal relationships 
necessary to build a database for the various SNA software programs with which the 
author was working. However, due to the overlap of several other fields of study with the 
subject matter contained in The Ugly American, applying the relatively new concepts of 
network theory and SNA to the 54-year-old text seemed to be a novel idea that at the 
least could provide the author with hours upon hours of data-coding and an appreciation 
for the work that is involved in the SNA process.   
The first network visualization that was produced contained 89 of the 95 
characters presented in this study (see Figure 7). This aggregate network appeared to be 
in line with what was to be expected and did not result in any further assessment of the 
project beyond its immediate intended purpose. However, when the various subnetworks 
were extracted from the aggregate network they unexpectedly appeared to represent 
several of the network structures that are found frequently throughout network literature 
(i.e., core/periphery, hub-and-spoke, and mesh). This unforeseen occurrence led to more 
analysis and a concerted effort to try to identify any characteristics that might have 
contributed to the formation of these distinct network models. 
The ensuing research crossed over multiple academic fields from organizational 
management theory and behavioral studies to anthropology and emerging thought 
concerning the future of irregular warfare. The core of this study, despite borrowing from 
other disciplines, remains anchored to the study of complex networks and the use of SNA 
network visualization to reveal characteristics of human interaction that may not be 
readily apparent when experienced first-hand or read in a book. While the focus of this 
work is primarily on implications for military and interagency network design, the 
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observations discussed are largely drawn from studies conducted outside of military or 
governmental spheres and are intended to be applicable across the whole-of-government 
approach as well as with civilian efforts. 
B. METHODS   
This work has concentrated on combining relatively recent discoveries in the field 
of network analysis with the decades-old truisms of how to successfully work with 
indigenous populations that are illustrated in Lederer and Burdick’s The Ugly American. 
SNA software offers the ability to look at the distinct approaches to host nation 
interaction presented in The Ugly American in a new light, specifically through network 
visualizations. These visualizations, when combined with relevant observations by 
contemporary network theorists, provide “models” for host nation network development. 
These models are intended to offer insight for any individual or group working to build 
trust and influence indigenous populations.   
To produce the network sociograms central to this study, 95 of the characters that 
appear throughout The Ugly American were encoded into UCINET software based on 
their trust, advice, friendship, organizational, operational, and business ties to one 
another. Individual attributes consisting of each character’s nationality and general role 
were also identified and added to the analysis. The resulting conglomeration of social ties 
and attributes then was processed through UCINET’s visualization software, NetDraw, to 
generate the aggregate network picture seen in Figure 7. To separate each change agent’s 
subnetwork from the aggregate network, extended ego-networks were isolated that 
contained all of the relevant actors that were directly involved with each change agent’s 
individual efforts. The network of MacWhite’s predecessor, Ambassador Sears, also was 
coded and isolated to illustrate the closed and “provincial” nature of the U.S. Embassy in 
Sarkhan prior to MacWhite’s arrival.   
C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Each of the networks described in this study offer unique examples of key 
components associated with network design and group collaboration. This study is not 
meant to be comprehensive either in terms of the analysis of each of the separate 
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networks or in the illumination of all of the networks present in the entire book. The four 
principle change agents discussed here approach their networks in different manners and 
eventually occupy different positions within their networks’ structure (see Figure 21). 
John Colvin, who is not analyzed in detail in this work, works by himself as a change 
agent to help the people of Sarkhan. Colonel Hillandale draws local nationals and host 
nation government personnel directly to him through his gifts of persuasion and high 
levels of cross-cultural understanding. Father Finian purposely keeps himself segregated 
from the core of his network while working primarily through a proxy. Homer Atkins 
relishes the opportunity to become one with his network; he seeks local solutions and 
methods to solve local problems and works side-by-side with the locals to implement 
them. And, finally, Ambassador MacWhite’s comprehensive efforts to pull effective 
people into his network are successful largely due to his ability to remain supportive 
while actively detached from the day-to-day operations of his network’s members. The 
distinctive results that each of these approaches produce are evident in their respective 
sociograms.  
 
Figure 21.  The “Ugly” Networks 
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Throughout the book, the vast majority of the characters are Americans truly 
intent on helping other people. They approach their counterparts from a position of 
mutual respect, they make mistakes and ask for help from their foreign friends, and they 
appreciate foreign culture and do not try to impose an American way-of-life on 
indigenous populations. With the exception of the broader attempt to promote the ideals 
of freedom and self-determination in the face of Communist expansion, the principal 
characters in The Ugly American seek to work by, with, and through locals to help them 
achieve their goals and to realize their own version of a better life.  
Ambassador MacWhite’s methodology illustrates how network designers can 
orchestrate the emergence of a far-reaching, decentralized network that is capable of 
producing innovative solutions that would not have been likely had he taken a more 
active role in their management.   He uses his weak ties to find other change agents then 
maximizes the effectiveness of their individual approaches by not micro-managing their 
efforts. MacWhite also provides a lesson in network resiliency by not preparing his 
network for his departure or for the poor reception that his unconventional approach 
garners from veteran diplomats. He arguably could have done more to ensure that his 
methods were understood and appreciated back in Washington while simultaneously 
preparing the network for the inevitable disruptions that would challenge its continued 
existence.   
Homer Atkins demonstrates principles of effective collaboration during his work 
in Sarkhan by carefully building consensus among all of the Sarkhanese villagers who 
had a stake in his planned endeavor. Throughout the entire process of developing and 
manufacturing a locally sustainable irrigation pump, Homer and his wife Emma work 
diligently to ensure that their efforts are relevant to the indigenous situation and that the 
initiative is self-sustaining and will not require external support once they depart.   
Father Finian reveals how facilitating group collaboration rather than dictating 
organizational roles and functions can result in the emergence of a self-organizing 
network with tremendous internalized credibility and an innovative approach to problem-
solving. Finian carefully vetted his proxy, U Tien, and then accepted the risk that his 
efforts could be compromised by other members of the network that U Tien selected 
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without Finian’s direct involvement. This approach ensured that Finian remained far 
enough removed from the actual formation of the network that his personal influence 
would not appear to be the driving factor behind the group coming together. He was then 
able to assist the network in its subversion campaign against the Communist 
infrastructure in Burma without it appearing (either to the network’s members or to 
external scrutiny) that the network was being manipulated by an outside actor.   
Colonel Hillandale’s exploits in the Philippines and Sarkhan show how achieving 
high levels of cross-cultural understanding can provide a mechanism for subtle yet 
profoundly effective influence on indigenous populations and host nation counterparts. 
His quest to grasp what motivated the various societies and individuals that he found 
himself working among was central to his technique. By combining his cultural 
knowledge and ability to skillfully manipulate people with a check on his own cognitive 
biases, he frequently became a trusted insider who the locals identified with and listened 
to.   
All of these examples of grey network development provide discrete methods for 
designing or altering indigenous networks that have the capacity to indirectly assist 
broader efforts to target adversarial organizations (like the Communist apparatus that 
MacWhite was ultimately trying to defeat). By undertaking similar tasks, network 
developers have the potential to build networks in areas that may otherwise be used or 
influenced by adversarial elements. Once properly established these networks may also 
be used for a wide variety of collateral applications that can support irregular warfare 
activities while not compromising their initial and predominant purpose. Finally, gaining 
an increased understanding of how grey network development can be initiated to subtly 
or indirectly influence neutral or non-aligned communities can provide knowledgeable 
parties with indications of adversarial entrepreneurship (i.e., enemy efforts to develop 
grey networks). Adversarial grey network development, as evidenced by decades of 
Communist political entrepreneurship throughout the Third World, may actually be more 
effective at influencing the outcome of an internal struggle than any form of violent, 
kinetic activity.   
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Although the study of networks is a relatively young field, scholars have already 
identified numerous components, distinctions, and ways of analyzing networks that 
reveal nearly endless variation between individual networks. By applying network 
analytical approaches to a study of The Ugly American, this work aims to generate further 
discussion and consideration concerning how specific approaches to network 
development might be identified, categorized, and summarized—all with the intention of 
being able to recreate the types of successful grey network development presented not 
only in The Ugly American but also in other texts and from other sources.  
Further analysis of The Ugly American has the capacity to reveal even more 
examples of specific manifestations of modern theories and long-standing truisms from a 
wide array of academic fields. There are many other characters whose inclusion in a more 
comprehensive study could reveal much more about the complex nature of designing 
indigenous networks and executing foreign policy abroad—even as it existed in a 
fictionalized account over half a century ago. Additionally, consideration could be given 
to the evolution of the Foreign Service by juxtaposing how the State Department was 
characterized and caricatured by Lederer and Burdick and how it exists today or how it 
may be counter-argued that it even existed back when the book was first written. Finally, 
although not included in this study, an in-depth analysis of the SNA metrics that 
correspond to each network model (e.g., network topography, centrality measures, or 
subgroup cohesion) may reveal additional characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses 
inherent in each approach. 
While the task of network analysis is currently being undertaken on an incredibly 
large scale in numerous fields of study, Roberts’ Continuum of Network Designs and 
Anklam’s Network Components (i.e., purpose, structure, style, and value) offer an 
extremely accessible method of introducing basic network analysis to a wide audience 
who may not possess the levels of esoteric knowledge related to the more conventional 
metrics-based and software intensive SNA approaches. Applying a similar analytical 
approach to network development outside of The Ugly American holds the potential to 
further illustrate the utility of complex network theory and basic SNA and to prove or 
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disprove some of the assertions contained in this work. Of the many questions that should 
emerge from this study of The Ugly American is:  Are the principle characteristics 
assigned to each change agent truly indicative of a unique approach to network design or 
in any way representative of a specific network structure?  Only one book, a factually-
based fictional account at that, was used. Without further research it is not possible to 
predict whether or not the network structures that were presented in this study exist 
elsewhere as a result of similar approaches to network design and interpersonal 
interaction.   
Being able to analyze or perhaps design networks based on the principles 
highlighted in this study provides tremendous potential for U.S. military personnel 
(particularly Special Forces and Civil Affairs personnel). Cell phones and the Internet are 
helping to rapidly “flatten” the world and are bringing people and organizations in 
contact and communication with one another with unprecedented frequency and fidelity. 
Traditional, hierarchical organizational structures are finding it increasingly difficult to 
keep up with rapidly changing situations in a dynamic interconnected global 
environment. Military professionals trained in network analysis and design are prepared 
not only to help streamline and maximize efficiency within military organizations, but 
possess the ability to initiate or modify networks and organizations in foreign countries—
regardless of whether or not their ultimate purpose is to assist local communities, impact 
or interdict adversarial networks, or either directly or indirectly promote U.S. interests in 
the target region. 
Ongoing and subsequent study of the various irregular warfare and 
counterinsurgency initiatives undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan will undoubtedly reveal 
additional best practices and lessons learned that must be included in how future military 
leaders are trained to conduct irregular operations. However, the scope of this work is 
limited to advancing an operational understanding of how irregular warfare activities can 
be augmented by utilizing the network approach to influence populations and popular 
support. New analytical approaches and SNA software tools have the potential to greatly 
enhance traditional methods (e.g., link-analysis) that are used to both assess friendly and 
adversarial groups and inform strategists and planners of how best to design operations 
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aimed at influencing those actors. However, the U.S. military and interagency apparatus 
must remain cautious and not be too hasty in applying 21st-century solutions to what are 
frequently 19th- and 20th-century problems. It has proven exceedingly difficult for 
members of one of the most technologically advanced nations on earth to find a way to 
forego reliance on advanced education and computer-aided analysis in favor of measured, 
locally relevant initiatives like those presented in The Ugly American. Achieving a 
balance between modern technology and good old-fashioned people skills is needed now 
more than ever. 
As mentioned previously, the inferences made and implications presented here are 
not intended to be comprehensive or concrete. They are intended primarily as a thought 
exercise concerning what techniques and principles drawn from contemporary academia 
might best explain the SNA-based visualizations that were produced by coding a portion 
of the relationships in The Ugly American. In the end, this study is intended to generate 
discussion about how best to design host nation networks and how to deal with 
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